The complexity of approximately counting stable matchings  by Chebolu, Prasad et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 437 (2012) 35–68
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Theoretical Computer Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
The complexity of approximately counting stable matchings✩
Prasad Chebolu, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Russell Martin ∗
Department of Computer Science, Ashton Bldg, Ashton St, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 8 December 2010
Received in revised form 7 February 2012
Accepted 13 February 2012
Communicated by J. Díaz
Keywords:
Stable marriage problem
Approximation-preserving reduction
Counting independent sets in bipartite
graphs (#BIS)
a b s t r a c t
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the k-attri-
bute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of ‘‘preference
vectors’’ with ‘‘attribute vectors’’, or by Euclidean distances between ‘‘preference points
‘‘and ‘‘attribute points’’. Irving and Leather (1986) [14] proved that counting the number
of stable matchings in the general case is #P-complete. Counting the number of stable
matchings is reducible to counting the number of downsets in a (related) partial order [14]
and is interreducible, in an approximation-preserving sense, to a class of problems that
includes counting the number of independent sets in a bipartite graph (#BIS) (Dyer et al.
(2004) [6]). It is conjectured that no FPRAS exists for this class of problems. We show
this approximation-preserving interreducibility remains even in the restricted k-attribute
setting when k ≥ 3 (dot products) or k ≥ 2 (Euclidean distances). Finally, we show it is
easy to count the number of stable matchings in the 1-attribute dot-product setting.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Stable Matchings
The stable matching problem (or stable marriage problem) is a classical combinatorics problem. An instance of this problem
consists of nmen and nwomen, where each man has his own preference list (a total ordering) of the women, and, similarly,
each woman has her own preference list of the men. A one-to-one pairing of the men with the women is called amatching
(or marriage). Given a matching, if there exists a man M and a woman w in the matching who prefer each other over their
partners in thematching, then thematching is considered unstable and theman–woman pair (M, w) is called a blocking pair.
(M andwwould prefer to drop their current partners and pair up with each other.) If a matching has no blocking pairs, then
we call it a stable matching. In 1962, Gale and Shapley proved that every stable matching instance has a stable matching, and
described an O(n2) algorithm for finding one [7].
The stable matching problem hasmany variants, where ties in the preference lists could be allowed, where people might
have partial preference lists (i.e. someone might prefer to remain single rather than be paired with certain members of the
opposite sex), generalizations to men/women/pets, universities and applicants, students and projects, etc. Some of these
generalizations have also been well-studied and, indeed, algorithms for finding stable matchings are used for assigning
residents to hospitals in Scotland, Canada, and the USA [3,18,20].
In this paper, we concentrate solely on the classical problem, so the term ‘‘matching instance’’ will refer to one where
the number of men is equal to the number of women, and each man or women has their own full totally-ordered (i.e. no
ties allowed) preference list for the opposite sex.
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Irving and Leather [14] demonstrated that counting the number of stable matchings for a given instance is #P-
complete. This completeness result relies on the connection between stable marriages and downsets in a related partial
order (explained in more detail in Section 3), as counting the number of downsets in a partial order is another classical
#P-complete problem [19].
Knowing that exactly counting stable matchings is difficult (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions), one
might turn to methods for approximately counting this number. In particular, we would like to find a fully-polynomial
randomized approximation scheme (an FPRAS) for this task, i.e. an algorithm that provides an arbitrarily close approximation
in time polynomial in the input size and the desired error — see Section 2 for a formal definition. One method that has
proven successful for other counting problems is the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. This technique exploits
a relationship between counting and sampling described by Jerrum et al. [15], namely, for self-reducible combinatorial
structures, the existence of an FPRAS is computationally equivalent to a polynomial-time algorithm for approximate
sampling from the set of structures. Although the set of stablematchings for an instance does not obviously fit into the class of
self-reducible problems, an efficient algorithm for (approximately) sampling a random stable matching can be transformed
into a method for (approximately) counting this number.
Bhatnagar et al. [1] considered this problem of sampling a random stable matching using the MCMC method. They
examined a natural Markov chain that uses ‘‘male-improving’’ and ‘‘female-improving’’ rotations (see Section 3.3) to define
a random walk on the state space of stable matchings for a given instance. In the most general setting, matching instances
can be exhibited for which themixing time of the randomwalk has an exponential lower bound, meaning that it will take an
exponential amount of time to (approximately) sample a random stable matching. This exponential mixing time is due to
the existence of a ‘‘bad cut’’ in the state space. Bhatnagar, et al. considered several restricted settings for matching instances
and were still able to show instances for which such a bad cut exists in the state space, implying an exponential mixing time
in these restricted settings.
Of particular interest to us in this paper, Bhatnagar et al. examined the so-called k-attribute model. In this setting each
man andwoman has two k-dimensional vectors associatedwith them, a ‘‘preference’’ vector and a ‘‘position’’ (or ‘‘attribute’’)
vector. A man Mi has a preference vector denoted by Mˆi, and a position vector denoted by M¯i (similarly denoted for the
womanwj). Then,Mi preferswj overwℓ (i.e.wj appears higher on his preference list thanwℓ) if and only if Mˆi · w¯j > Mˆi · w¯ℓ,
where Mˆi · w¯j denotes the usual k-dimensional dot product of vectors. Since we assume that each man has a total order over
the women (and vice-versa), we note that Mˆi · w¯j ≠ Mˆi · w¯ℓ whenever j ≠ ℓ (and analogously for the women’s preference
vectors/men’s position vectors).
Even in this restricted k-attribute setting (not everymatching instance can be represented in thismanner if k is small [2]),
Bhatnagar, Greenberg, and Randall were still able to demonstrate examples of matching instances having a ‘‘bad cut’’ where
theMarkov chain has an exponentialmixing time. Bhatnagar et al. also considered two other restricted settings, the so-called
k-range and k-listmodels, but wewill not be considering those cases here. (Again, they gave instances having an exponential
mixing time for the Markov chain.)
It must be noted that even though the male-improving/female-improving Markov chain might have an exponential
mixing time, this does not necessarily imply the non-existence of an FPRAS for the corresponding counting problems.
However, Dyer et al. [6] give evidence suggesting that even approximately counting the number of stable matchings is itself
difficult, i.e. suggesting that an FPRAS may not exist. They do this by demonstrating approximation-preserving reductions
amongst several counting problems, one being that of counting downsets in a partial order (once again, the connection to
stable matchings is outlined in Section 3). Relevant background about approximation-preserving reductions is discussed in
Section 2. The main point is that the existence of an FPRAS for one problem would imply the existence of an FPRAS for this
entire class of counting problems. Currently, the existence of such an FPRAS remains an open question.
It is precisely the goal of this paper to consider the complexity of the approximate counting problem for the k-attribute
model.
Before we continue, let us formally define some counting problems. Two counting problems relevant to us are:
Name: #SM .
Instance: A stable matching instance with nmen and nwomen.
Output: The number of stable matchings.
Name: #SM(k-attribute).
Instance: A stable matching instance with nmen and nwomen in the k-attribute setting, i.e. preference lists are determined
using dot products between k-dimensional preference and position vectors as mentioned above.
Output: The number of stable matchings.
As we stated previously, if k is small (relative to n), there exist preference lists that are not realizable in the k-attribute
setting [2]. On the other hand, if k = n then we can clearly represent any set of n preference lists by simply using a separate
coordinate for each person to rank the members of the opposite sex.
Another counting problem we consider in this paper is the following one:
Name: #SM(k-Euclidean).
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Instance: A stable matching instance with nmen and n women in the k-dimensional Euclidean setting. In this setting, men
and women each have a ‘‘preference point’’ and ‘‘position point’’. Preference lists are determined using Euclidean distances
between preference points and position points.
Output: The number of stable matchings.
In other words, for a k-Euclidean stable matching instance man Mi prefers woman wj to woman wℓ if and only if
d(Mˆi, w¯j) < d(Mˆi, w¯ℓ), where d(x, y) is the Euclidean distance between points x and y. Once again, ties are not allowed
in the preference lists.
Before we describe our results, let us give a brief introduction to approximation-preserving (AP) reductions and AP-
reducibility. Further details can be found in Section 2.
1.2. AP-reducibility (a brief introduction)
Approximate counting problems have been of increasing interest in recent years. Some success has been demonstrated
by finding fully-polynomial randomized approximation schemes for some #P-complete problems. Likewise, there are some
(but fewer) problems known to not admit an FPRAS under usual complexity-theoretic assumptions.
AP-reducibility (for approximation-preserving reducibility) is similar in nature to reductions used in showing problems
are NP-complete. Broadly speaking, if g is an integer-valued function (that counts some type of combinatorial structure)
and there is an approximation-preserving reduction from another integer-valued function f (counting something else) to g ,
then an FPRAS for g gives us an FPRAS for f . (Similar to Turing reductions, the problem sizes are polynomially related and
the error terms of the approximations are also polynomially related.) In this case wewould write f ≤AP g to mean that f has
an AP-reduction to g . Similarly we write f ≡AP g to mean that f ≤AP g and g ≤AP f , or that f and g are AP-interreducible.
Definitions are provided in Section 2.
This kind of AP-reduction allows us to study the relative complexity of approximate counting problems, just as
polynomial many-one reductions allow us to compare the complexity of decision problems such as graph coloring and
satisfiability.
The complexity class #RHΠ1 of counting problems was introduced by Dyer et al. [6] as a means to classify a wide class of
approximate counting problems that were previously of indeterminate computational complexity. The problems in #RHΠ1
are those that can be expressed in terms of counting the number of models of a logical formula from a certain syntactically
restricted class. Although the authors were not aware of it at the time, this syntactically restricted class had already been
studied under the title ‘‘restricted Krom SNP’’ [4]. The complexity class #RHΠ1 has a completeness class (with respect to
AP-reductions) which includes a wide and ever-increasing range of natural counting problems, including: independent sets
in a bipartite graph, downsets in a partial order, configurations in the Widom-Rowlinson model (all [6]) and the partition
function of the ferromagnetic Ising model with mixed external field [9]. Either all of these problems have an FPRAS, or none
do. No FPRAS is currently known for any of them, despite much effort having been expended on finding one.
All the problems in the completeness class mentioned above are inter-reducible via AP-reductions, so any of them could
be said to exemplify the completeness class. However, mainly for historical reasons, the following problem tends to be taken
as a key example in the class, much in the same way that Sat has a privileged status in the theory on NP-completeness.
Name: #BIS.
Instance: A bipartite graph B.
Output: The number of independent sets in B.
Ge and Štefankovič [8] recently proposed an interesting newMCMC algorithm for sampling independent sets in bipartite
graphs. Unfortunately, however, the relevant Markov chain mixes slowly [11] so even this interesting new idea does not
give an FPRAS for #BIS. In fact, Goldberg and Jerrum [10] conjecture that no FPRAS exists for #BIS (or for the other problems
in the completeness class). We make this conjecture on empirical grounds, namely that the problem has survived its first
decade despite considerable efforts to find an FPRAS and the collection of known #BIS-equivalent problems is growing.
Since Dyer et al. show that #BIS and counting downsets are both complete in this class, and it is known that counting
downsets is equivalent to counting stable matchings, the result of Dyer et al. implies #BIS ≡AP #SM .
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate AP-interreducibility of #BIS with the two restricted stable matching problems
defined in Section 1.1.
1.3. Our results
In this paper we prove the following results:
Theorem 1. #BIS ≡AP #SM(k-attribute) when k ≥ 3.
In other words, #BIS is AP-interreducible with counting stable matchings in the k-attribute setting when k ≥ 3, so this
problem is equivalent in terms of approximability to the complete problems in the complexity class #RHΠ1.
Theorem 2. #SM(1-attribute) is solvable in polynomial time.
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We can also prove AP-interreducibility with #BIS in the k-Euclidean setting (when k ≥ 2) in a similar manner. Recall that
in the k-Euclidean setting, preference lists are determined by (closest) Euclidean distances between the ‘‘preference points’’
and ‘‘position points’’.
Theorem 3. #BIS ≡AP #SM(k-Euclidean) when k ≥ 2.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows:
We review further background on approximation schemes and AP-reductions in Section 2.
Section 3 reviews some combinatorics of the stable matching problem that is relevant for our purposes in this paper.
Section 4 demonstrates Theorem 1 and Section 5 is devoted to proving Theorem 2.
We give the construction required to demonstrate Theorem 3 in Section 6. This construction ends up giving us identical
preference lists as those for the k-attribute (k ≥ 3) model. Thus, the remainder of the proof to show AP-interreducibility
between #SM(k-Euclidean) for k ≥ 2 and #BIS is identical to that for the 3-attribute setting and is not repeated.
2. Randomized approximation schemes and approximation-preserving reductions
A randomized approximation scheme is an algorithm for approximately computing the value of a function f : Σ∗ → R.
The approximation scheme has a parameter ε > 0 which specifies the error tolerance. A randomized approximation scheme
for f is a randomized algorithm that takes as input an instance x ∈ Σ∗ (e.g., for the problem #SM , the input would be an
encoding of a stable matching instance) and a rational error tolerance ε > 0, and outputs a rational number z (a random
variable of the ‘‘coin tosses’’ made by the algorithm) such that, for every instance x,
Pr

e−ϵ f (x) ≤ z ≤ eϵ f (x) ≥ 3
4
. (1)
The randomized approximation scheme is said to be a fully polynomial randomized approximation scheme, or FPRAS, if it runs
in time bounded by a polynomial in |x| and ϵ−1. Note that the quantity 3/4 in Eq. (1) could be changed to any value in the
open interval ( 12 , 1)without changing the set of problems that have randomized approximation schemes [15, Lemma 6.1].
We now define the notion of an approximation-preserving (AP) reduction. Suppose that f and g are functions from Σ∗
to R. As mentioned before, an AP-reduction from f to g gives a way to turn an FPRAS for g into an FPRAS for f . Here is the
formal definition. An approximation-preserving reduction from f to g is a randomized algorithmA for computing f using an
oracle for g . The algorithmA takes as input a pair (x, ε) ∈ Σ∗× (0, 1), and satisfies the following three conditions: (i) every
oracle call made by A is of the form (w, δ), where w ∈ Σ∗ is an instance of g , and 0 < δ < 1 is an error bound satisfying
δ−1 ≤ poly(|x|, ε−1); (ii) the algorithm A meets the specification for being a randomized approximation scheme for f (as
described above) whenever the oracle meets the specification for being a randomized approximation scheme for g; and
(iii) the run-time ofA is polynomial in |x| and ε−1.
According to the definition, approximation-preserving reductionsmay use randomization andmaymakemultiple oracle
calls. Nevertheless, the reductions that we present in this paper are deterministic. Each reduction makes a single oracle call
(with δ = ϵ) and returns the result of that oracle call. A word of warning about terminology: Subsequent to [6], the notation
≤AP has beenused to denote a different type of approximation-preserving reductionwhich applies to optimizationproblems.
We will not study optimization problems in this paper, so hopefully this will not cause confusion.
3. Combinatorics of the stable matching problem
The (classical) stable matching problem has a rich combinatorial structure which has been widely studied. We relate
some aspects of this structure that we will need in this paper. Many of the definitions and results that follow can be found,
for example, in [16,14,13,12].
3.1. The Gale–Shapley algorithm
In their seminal paper on the stable matching problem, Gale and Shapley [7] gave a polynomial-time algorithm for
constructing a stable matching. This is generally referred to as the ‘‘proposal algorithm’’ and bears the names of Gale and
Shapley in all of the literature on stable matchings. One sex (typically the men) make proposals to members of the other,
forming ‘‘engagements’’. Once all the ‘‘proposers’’ are engaged, the algorithm terminates with a stable matching.
A description of this algorithm follows.
As noted by Gale and Shapley (and others), the above algorithm computes the male-optimal stable matching, which is
optimal in the very strong sense that everyman likes his partner in this matching at least asmuch as his partner in any other
stable matching. Given an instance with nmen and nwomen, the algorithm computes the male-optimal stable matching in
time O(n2).
During the algorithm, after a woman becomes ‘‘engaged’’ she never becomes free, though she might be engaged to
different men at different times during the execution of the algorithm. On the other hand, a man could oscillate between
being free and being engaged.
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Algorithm 1 Gale–Shapley Algorithm
• Initially every man and every woman is free.
• Repeat until all men are engaged:
• A free manM proposes tow, the highest woman on his list who has not already rejected him.
– Ifw is free, then she accepts the proposal andM andw become engaged.
– Ifw is engaged toM ′, then
∗ LetM+ be the favorite ofw between menM andM ′.
∗ LetM− be the least favorite ofw between menM andM ′.
∗ M+ andw become engaged to each other.
∗ w rejectsM− andM− is set free.
It is well-known (see, e.g. [7,16]) that the male-optimal matching may be obtained by taking any ordering of the men
and have them make proposals in that order, i.e. when ‘‘a free man M proposes...’’ we can take the highest free man in our
ordering of the men to perform the next proposal.
By reversing the roles of men and women (i.e. the women are the ‘‘proposers’’), we can obtain the female-optimal stable
matching.
3.2. Stable matching lattice
Given a matching instance and two stable matchingsM andM′ where
M = {(M1, w1), (M2, w2), . . . , (Mn, wn)},
M′ = {(M ′1, w1), (M ′2, w2), . . . , (M ′n, wn)},
we define max{Mi,M ′i }, min{Mi,M ′i }, max{M,M′} and min{M,M′} as follows:
max{Mi,M ′i } = favorite choice of womanwi between menMi andM ′i
min{Mi,M ′i } = least preferred choice of womanwi between menMi andM ′i
max{M,M′} = {(max{M1,M ′1}, w1), (max{M2,M ′2}, w2), . . . , (max{Mn,M ′n}, wn)}
min{M,M′} = {(min{M1,M ′1}, w1), (min{M2,M ′2}, w2), . . . , (min{Mn,M ′n}, wn)}
Note that in the expressionmax{Mi,M ′i }, the womanwi can be deduced from the arguments since she is the only woman
married toMi inM and toM ′i inM′. From [16], we have thatmax{M,M′} andmin{M,M′} are themselves stablematchings.
Further, we define the relation M ≤ M′ if and only if M′ = max{M,M′}. It is clear that the relation ≤ is reflexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive. Hence, the stable matchings of a stable matching instance form a lattice under the≤ relation.
In fact, this lattice is a distributive lattice under the ‘‘max’’ and ‘‘min’’ operations defined above [16]. The male-optimal
matching is theminimumelement in this lattice (under the≤ relation), while the female-optimalmatching is themaximum
element.
It is well-known (see, for instance, [5]) that a finite distributive lattice is isomorphic to the lattice of downsets of another
partial order (ordered by subset inclusion).We shall shortly see how this other downset lattice arises in the context of stable
matchings, and its connection to the stable matching lattice.
3.3. Stable pairs and rotations
Definition 3.1. A pair (M, w) is called stable if and only if (M, w) is a pair in some stable matchingM. A pair (M, w) that is
not stable is called an unstable pair.
Definition 3.2. LetM be a stable matching. For any manM (womanw), let spM(M) (spM(w)) denote the spouse of manM
(womanw) in the matchingM.
Definition 3.3 ([1]). LetM be a stablematching. The suitor of amanM is defined to be the first womanw onM ’s preference
list such that (i)M prefers his spouse overw and (ii)w prefersM over her spouse. The suitor of manM is denoted by SM(M).
We note that SM(M)may not exist for every man. For instance, ifM is the female-optimal stable matching, then SM(M)
would not exist.
Definition 3.4 ([14]). LetM be a stable matching. Let R = {(M0, w0), (M1, w1), . . . , (Mk−1, wk−1)} be an ordered list of
pairs fromM such that for every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ k− 1, SM(Mi) iswi+1( mod k). Then R is a rotation (exposed in the matchingM).
A stable matching may have many or no exposed rotations. Applying an exposed rotation to a stable matching (i.e.
breaking the pairs (Mi, wi) and forming the new pairs (Mi, wi+1)) gives a new stable matching in which the women are
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‘‘happier" and the men are less happy. In other words, after a rotation, every woman (respectively, man) involved in the
rotation is married to someone higher (resp. lower) on her (resp. his) preference list than her (resp. his) partner in the
rotation.
We can similarly define suitors for the women, given some stable matchingM. We do not need to do so for the purposes
of this paper, but the Markov chain that Bhatnagar, et al. examine in [1] consists of moves that are ‘‘male-improving’’ and
‘‘female-improving’’ rotations. Starting from any stable matching, it is possible to obtain any other stable matching using
some (appropriately chosen) sequence of male-improving and/or female-improving rotations [14].
Definition 3.5 ([12]). A pair (M, w), not necessarily stable, is said to be eliminated by the rotation R if Rmovesw fromM or
below on her preference list to a man strictly aboveM .
Note that if a stable pair (M, w) in a rotation R is eliminated by R, and if (M, w′) is any other pair eliminated by R, then
manM prefersw overw′, for otherwise no matching that has R exposed in it could be stable.
Lemma 4 ([14]). No pair is eliminated by more than one rotation, and for any pair (M, w), at most one rotation moves M tow.
We can now define a relation on rotations.
Definition 3.6 ([14]). Let R and R′ be two distinct rotations. Rotation R is said to explicitly precede R′ if and only if R eliminates
a pair (M, w), and R′ moves M to a woman w′ such that M (strictly) prefers w to w′. The relation ‘‘precedes’’ is defined as
the transitive closure of the ‘‘explicitly precedes’’ relation.
If a rotation R explicitly precedes R′ then there is no stable matching with R′ exposed such that applying R′ results in a
stable matching with R exposed — the intermediate matching would have a blocking pair (hence would not be stable). The
relation precedes (≤) defines a partial order on the set of rotations of the stable matching instance. We call the partial order
on the set of rotations the rotation poset of the instance and denote it (P,≤).
The following theorem relates the rotations in the rotation poset to the stablematchings of the instance via the downsets
of P .
Theorem 5 ([14, Theorem 4.1]). For any stable matching instance, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the stable
matchings of that instance and the downsets of its rotation poset.
Every stablematching of the instance can be obtained by startingwith themale-optimal stablematching and performing
the rotations in the corresponding downset (ensuring that a rotation is performed before any rotation that succeeds it is
performed). Note that the downsets corresponding to the male-optimal stable matching and the female-optimal stable
matching are ∅ and P , respectively.
To construct the rotation poset, we need (i) the rotations and (ii) the precedence relations between them. We note that
oncewe have all the rotations in the poset, we can establish the precedence relations using the ‘‘explicitly precedes’’ relation,
i.e. by determining which (stable or unstable) pairs are eliminated by each rotation.
3.4. Gusfield’s algorithm for finding all rotations
Given a stable matching instance, let H be the Hasse diagram of the stable matching lattice defined in Section 3.2. That is,
H is the transitive reduction of the relation≤ on the set of stable matchings. Gusfield [12] gave a fast algorithm for finding
all rotations of a stable matching instance. His algorithm is a refinement of successive applications of the ‘‘breakmarriage’’
procedure of McVitie and Wilson [17]. The key ingredient in Gusfield’s proof that his algorithm is correct is the following.
Theorem 6 ([12, Theorem 6]). Let Φ be any path in H from the male-optimal stable matching to the female-optimal stable
matching. Then any two consecutive matchings on Φ differ by a single rotation, and the set of all rotations between matchings
alongΦ contains every rotation exactly once.
Gusfield presented a well-tuned version of his algorithm that runs in O(n2) time. For the sake of presentation, we use the
following, slower, variant of his algorithm (the variant still runs in polynomial time, which suffices for our purposes).
In Algorithm 2, the existence of t is guaranteed by the fact that the current stable matching Mi is different from the
female-optimal stable matching and, hence, has a rotation exposed in it. The correctness of the algorithm follows from
Theorem 6: Starting atMi, the algorithm applies a rotation to obtainMi+1. Since rotations improve the utility of the women
involved,Mi+1 ≥Mi. To apply Theorem 6we need only argue that the step fromMi toMi+1 is a single step inH rather than
multiple steps. Equivalently, we need to argue that the rotation betweenMi andMi+1 cannot be decomposed as a sequence
of smaller rotations (where these smaller rotations correspond to individual steps in H). This follows by the definition of
‘‘suitor’’ — ifMi has rotation R exposed and applying rotation R yields a stable matchingM′ with R′ exposed and applying
R′ yields Mi+1 then either R and R′ are disjoint (contradicting the fact that the transformation from Mi to Mi+1 can be
accomplished with a single rotation) or R and R′ share a man (in which case the transformation fromMi toMi+1 does not
move this man to his suitor inMi, so is not a rotation).
Once we find all of the rotations using Algorithm 2, we can order them to find the rotation poset P using the relation
given in Definition 3.6.
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Algorithm 2 Find-All-Rotations Algorithm
• Initially we start with the male-optimal stable matchingM0, and some ordering of the men.
• In the current matchingMi, among the ordered men, pick the first man who has a suitor. (If there are no men that have
a suitor, thenMi is the female-optimal matching and the algorithm stops.) Let manM1 be the first man who has a suitor,
namely SMi(M1).• Start constructing the sequence (M1, w1), (M2, w2), . . ., where w1 = spMi(M1), for l = 2, 3, . . ., wl = SMi(Ml−1) and
Ml = spMi(wl).• If there exists a t ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1} such that wt = wl, then return the rotation (Mt , wt), . . . , (Ml, wl), and apply the
rotation toMi to get a new stable matchingMi+1. Otherwise, increment l and continue constructing the sequence.
a b c d
f g h i j
a b c d
f g h i j
V2
V1
Fig. 1. The correspondence between independent sets and downsets.
3.5. #BIS, independent sets, and stable matchings
The rotation poset for a matching instance plays a key role in what follows. To prove Theorem 1, we take a #BIS instance
G = (V1∪V2, E) and view this as the rotation poset of a matching instance. In particular, G is the Hasse diagram of the poset
when we draw Gwith the set V2 ‘‘above’’ V1.
Each independent set in the bipartite graph naturally corresponds to a downset in the partial order, and vice-versa. See
Fig. 1 for an example. An independent set, namely {d, f , g}, is shown in the left of that figure. The corresponding downset is
shown on the right. This downset is obtained by taking the set {d, f , g} and adding the two elements a and b, as a < f and
b < f (and b < g) in the Hasse diagram. Conversely, given a downset, such as the one on the right of the diagram, we can
find the corresponding independent set in G by taking the set of maximal elements of the downset.
So givenG, we then construct amatching instance (using 3-dimensional preference and attribute vectors) whose rotation
poset is (isomorphic to) G, giving a 1–1 correspondence for our AP-reduction from #BIS to #SM(k-attribute), showing that
#BIS ≤AP #SM(k-attribute). This construction, and the proof of the correspondence, is in Section 4.
The reverse implication #SM(k-attribute) ≤AP #BIS follows from the two results that #SM ≤AP #Downsets (Theorem 5,
quoted here from [14]) and #Downsets ≤ #BIS [6, Lemma 9], where #Downsets is the problem of counting the number of
downsets in a partial order.
4. Stable matchings in the k-attribute model (k ≥ 3)
In this sectionwe give our construction to showAP-reducibility from#BIS to the k-attribute stablematchingmodelwhen
k ≥ 3.
Given our previous remarks about the relation between #BIS, independent sets, and stable matchings, our procedure is
as follows:
1. Let G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) denote a bipartite graph where |E| = n. Our goal will be to construct a k-attribute stable matching
instance for which we can show that the Hasse diagram of its rotation poset is G. This will give a bijection between stable
matchings and downsets of G, hence a bijection between stable matchings and independent sets of G.
2. Using G, in the manner to be specified in Section 4.1, we construct preference lists for a 3-attribute stable matching
instance with 3nmen and 3nwomen.
3. Given this matching instance, we find the male-optimal and female-optimal matchings.
4. Using the Find-All-Rotations algorithm, we extract the rotations from our stable matching instance.
5. Having these rotations, we construct the partial order, P , on these rotations (specified by the transitive closure of the
‘‘explicitly precedes’’ relation).
6. We finally show that P is isomorphic to G (when G is viewed as a partial order), thereby showing our construction is an
approximation-preserving reduction from #BIS to #SM(3-attribute).
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Fig. 2. A BIS instance and our labeling of its edges.
4.1. Construction of the stable matching instance
4.1.1. BIS and permutations
Let G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) denote our BIS instance, where E ⊆ V1 × V2 and |E| = n.
Using Gwewill construct a 3-attribute stablematching instancewith 3nmen and 3nwomen. Themen andwomen of the
instance are denoted {A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cn} and {a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, c1, . . . , cn}, respectively. To describe
our construction, we label the edges of G B1 through Bn from ‘‘left-to-right’’ with respect to the vertices (V1) on the bottom.
This becomes more clear from the example in Fig. 2. We refer to edge Bi as man Bi, and this will be clear from the context.
For our construction we associate two permutations, ρ and σ , of [n] = {1, . . . , n} with the BIS instance. The cycles of
ρ correspond to vertices in V1 and those of σ correspond to vertices in V2. In other words, if the edges incident to a vertex
in V2 are Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bid , then (i1, i2, . . . , id) is a σ -cycle. We define ρ-cycles in a similar fashion. If G has k = |V1| vertices
on the bottom and l = |V2| vertices on the top, then the permutations ρ and σ have k and l cycles, respectively. Since the
graph Gwill turn out to be isomorphic to a rotation poset, every vertex in Gwill represent a rotation in the stable matching
instance. The rotations of the stable matching instance will be governed by the ρ- and σ -cycles in a manner to be specified.
The rotations corresponding to the ρ-cycles will be called ρ-rotations and those corresponding to the σ -cycles will be called
σ -rotations.
In the example of Fig. 2, the three ρ-cycles are ρ1 = (1, 2, 3), ρ2 = (4, 5, 6), and ρ3 = (7, 8). The four σ -cycles are
σ1 = (1, 7), σ2 = (2, 4), σ3 = (5), and σ4 = (3, 6, 8).
Here is a brief overview of how we go about constructing a stable matching instance from a given bipartite graph.
First of all, the male-optimal stable matching in our matching instance we construct will consist of the pairs
(Ai, ai), (Bi, bi), (Ci, ci) for all i ∈ [n]. (We must show later this is indeed the case for the construction we describe.)
A ρ-cycle of the form (i1, i1 + 1, . . . , i2)will correspond to the ρ-rotation, R, of the form
{(Bi1 , bi1), (Ai1 , ai1), (Bi1+1, bi1+1), (Ai1+1, ai1+1), . . . , (Bi2 , bi2), (Ai2 , ai2)}.
This rotation R arises from a vertex v ∈ V1 with edges Bi1 , Bi1+1, . . . , Bi2 incident to it.
We will later show that a σ -rotation R′ is of the form
{(Bi1 , ai1), (Ci1 , ci1), (Bi2 , ai2), (Ci2 , ci2), . . . , (Bip , aip), (Cip , cip)},
where (i1, i2, . . . , ip) is the corresponding σ -cycle, and that the rotation R′ corresponds to the vertex v′ ∈ V2 with edges
Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bip incident to it.
In this manner, every rotation in the rotation poset is defined in terms of the men involved in them, the women being
the (then-current) partners of the men that are in the rotation. Assuming that the above two claims regarding rotations are
valid (as we will show below), we make the following observation.
Observation 7. A ρ-cycle and a σ -cycle can have at most one element in common. (This is because G is a graph and not a multi-
graph.) This means that a ρ-rotation and a σ -rotation can have at most one man in common. This similarly holds for the women.
In the next section we start by assigning preference vectors and position vectors to the men and women in our stable
matching instance. Following that, we construct the initial portion of their preference lists. We then find the male- and the
female-optimalmatchings using the Gale–Shapley algorithm. After finding themale- and the female-optimalmatchings, we
extract all the rotations of the rotation poset using the Find-All-Rotations algorithm. Finally, we obtain the rotation poset
by ordering rotations using the explicitly precedes relation. As we stated earlier, wewill find this rotation poset is isomorphic
to G, showing our construction is a mapping from the set of #BIS instances to #SM(3-attribute) instances.
4.1.2. Assigning preference and position vectors
Suppose D1, . . . ,Dl are the l cycles of σ of lengths p1, . . . , pl, respectively. Let ei be a representative element of cycle
Di. In other words, we can represent the σ -cycle Di as Di =

ei, σ (ei), . . . , σ pi−1(ei)

. (We may, for example, select ei to
be the smallest number in the cycle, and we will do so here). In what follows we will often abbreviate σ x = σ(x), σ 2x =
σ 2(x), σ−1x = σ−1(x), etc, and, similarly, ρx = ρ(x), etc.
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Fig. 3. Placement of the women’s position vectors and men’s preference vectors.
Let Rep(σ ) = {e1, e2 . . . , el} be the set of representative elements we choose for the cycles of σ . Let Wi = {ax : x ∈
Di} ∪ {bρx : x ∈ Di} ∪ {cσ−1x : x ∈ Di}. Let T (x) = {cσ−1x, ax, bρx}, where x ∈ Di. It follows that Wi = ∪x∈DiT (x) and
T (i) ∩ T (j) = ∅ for i ≠ j.
Using the definitions above, we begin to create a stable matching instance in the 3-attribute model whose rotation poset
is the graph G. As a reminder, every man, say Ai, is associated with two vectors: (i) a position vector denoted by A¯i, and (ii) a
preference vector denoted by Aˆi. Every woman similarly has her own position and preference vectors. Each man ranks the
women based on the dot product of his preference vector with their position vectors. In other words, if Aˆi · b¯ > Aˆi · c¯ , then
man Ai prefers woman b over c. Note that we can always assign preference vectors so that |Aˆi| = 1 (by normalizing those
vectors).
Our task, therefore, is to specify the position and preference vectors for all themen andwomen in ourmatching instance.
First we fix the position vectors of the women. The z-coordinate of women ai and ci is set to 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The
z-coordinate of woman bi is set to 4i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The x- and y-coordinates of ai, bi, and ci are such that the projection of
each women’s position vector onto the x-y plane lies on the unit circle x2 + y2 = 1. Furthermore, we group the projections
according to the setsWi. In other words, all women inWi are embedded in an angle of ϵ on the unit circle, where ϵ = 2π/n2.
These groups are embedded around the circle in the order W1 through Wl, and the angle between two adjacent groups is
(2π − lϵ)/l. Note thatWl is adjacent toWl−1 andW1. GroupWi starts at angle 2π(i− 1)/l and ends at 2π(i− 1)/l+ ϵ.
Within the groupWi, the women are further sub-grouped into triplets
T (ei), T (σ (ei)), . . . , T (σ pi−1(ei)).
Within the angle of size ϵ, the sub-groups are embedded in the order T (ei) through T (σ pi−1(ei)), with each T (·) spanning
an angle of 6θi. The angle between two adjacent T (·)’s is θi, where θi = ϵ/(7pi − 1). Within each T (x), the women appear
in the order cσ−1x, ax, and bρx, and the angle between c¯σ−1x and a¯x is 4θi, and the angle between a¯x and b¯ρx is 2θi (see Fig. 3).
We summarize the above description by giving the exact coordinates for the position vector for the women.
Let ϵ = 2π
n2
.
For ei ∈ Rep(σ ), let θi = ϵ/(7pi − 1). Then for 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1 define
a¯σmei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + 4θi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + 4θi), 0) ,
b¯ρσmei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + 6θi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + 6θi), 4ρσ
mei), and
c¯σm−1ei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi), 0) .
Next we define the preference vectors of the men. The z-coordinates of all Aˆi and Cˆi are set to 0. We place Aˆi between a¯i
and the projection onto the x-y plane of b¯ρi. If the angle between a¯i and (the projection of) b¯ρi is α, then the angle between
a¯i and Aˆi is 13α, and the angle between Aˆi and (the projection of) b¯ρi is
2
3α. This will ensure that Ai prefers ai over bρi. We will
later show that the preference list of Ai starts with aibρi. We place Cˆi between c¯i and a¯σ i such that if the angle between c¯i
and a¯σ i is β , then the angle between c¯i and Cˆi is 25β and the angle between Cˆi and a¯σ i is
3
5β . This will ensure that Ci prefers
ci over aσ i. We will later show that the preference list of Ci starts with ciaσ i.
Finally, we place Bˆi, which is of unit length, such that Bˆi makes an angle of φ = 2π/100 with the vertical axis (z-axis)
and its projection on the x-y plane is parallel to a¯i. In other words, the projection of Bˆi on the z = 0 plane is sinφ a¯i. We
summarize the above discussion by providing the exact coordinates of Aˆi, Bˆi, and Cˆi.
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Let φ = 2π/100 and ϵ = 2π
n2
.
For ei ∈ Rep(σ ), let θi = ϵ/(7pi − 1). Then for 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1 define
Aˆσmei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + (14/3)θi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + (14/3)θi), 0) ,
Bˆσmei = (sinφ cos(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + 4θi), sinφ sin(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + 4θi), cosφ),
and
Cˆσm−1ei = (cos(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + (8/5)θi), sin(2π(i− 1)/l+ 7mθi + (8/5)θi), 0) .
In Section 4.1.3 we establish the preference lists of the men and women. The vectors given above let us determine the
preference lists of the men, so we now specify the position vectors of the men and the preference vectors of the women.
This proceeds in a similar manner as above.
Suppose E1 through Ek are the k cycles of ρ of lengths q1 through qk, respectively. As above, let fi be a representative
element of cycle Ei, so that we can write the ρ-cycle as

fi, ρ(fi), . . . , ρqi−1(fi)

. Let Rep(ρ) = {f1, f2 . . . , fk} be the set of
representative elements we select for the cycles of ρ. Let Ui = {Aρ−1r : r ∈ Ei} ∪ {Br : r ∈ Ei} ∪ {Cr : r ∈ Ei}. Let
S(r) = {Aρ−1r , Br , Cr}, where r ∈ Ei. It follows that Ui = ∪r∈EiS(r) and S(i) ∩ S(j) = ∅ for i ≠ j.
We fix the position vectors of themen. The placement of themen is similar to that of the women. The z-coordinate of the
men Ai and Bi is set to 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The z-coordinate of man Ci is set to 4i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The x- and y-coordinates of Ai, Bi
and Ci are such that the projection of the men onto the z = 0 plane lies on the unit circle x2 + y2 = 1. Similar to above, the
projections are grouped according to the sets Ui. In other words, with ϵ = 2π/n2, all men in Ui are embedded in an angle
of ϵ on the unit circle. The groups are embedded around the circle in the order U1 through Uk and the angle between two
adjacent groups is (2π − kϵ)/k. Note that Uk is adjacent to Uk−1 and U1. The group Ui starts at angle 2π(i− 1)/k and ends at
2π(i− 1)/k+ ϵ. Within the group Ui, the men are further sub-grouped into triplets S(fi), S(ρ(fi)), . . . , S(ρqi−1(fi)). Within
the angle of ϵ, the sub-groups are embedded in the order S(fi) through S(ρqi−1(fi)), with each S(·) spanning an angle of 6ωi,
where the angle between two adjacent S(·)’s is ωi = ϵ/(7qi − 1). Within each S(j), the men appear in the order Aρ−1j, Bj
and Cj, and the angle between A¯ρ−1j and B¯j is 4ωi and the angle between B¯j and C¯j is 2ωi. Here are the exact coordinates for
the position vector of each man.
Let ϵ = 2π
n2
.
For fi ∈ Rep(ρ), let ωi = ϵ/(7qi − 1). Then for 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1 we define
A¯ρm−1fi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi), 0) ,
B¯ρmfi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + 4ωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + 4ωi), 0) , and
C¯ρmfi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + 6ωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + 6ωi), 4ρ
mfi).
Finally, we define the preference vectors of the women. The z-coordinates of bˆi and cˆi are set to 0. Suppose the angle
between B¯i and (the projection onto the x-y plane of) C¯i is α. Thenwe place cˆi in the x–y plane between B¯i and (the projection
of) C¯i such that the angle between B¯i and cˆi is 13α, and the angle between cˆi and (the projection of) C¯i is
2
3α. We place bˆi
between A¯ρ−1i and B¯i such that if the angle between A¯ρ−1i and B¯i is β , then the angle between A¯ρ−1i and bˆi is
2
5β and the
angle between bˆi and B¯i is 35β .
We place aˆi, which is of unit length, such that aˆi makes an angle of φ = 2π/100 with the vertical axis (z-axis) and its
projection on the z = 0 plane is parallel to B¯i. In other words, the projection of aˆi on the z = 0 plane is sinφ B¯i. Therefore,
the exact coordinates of the preference vectors cˆi, aˆi and bˆi are as follows.
Let φ = 2π/100 and ϵ = 2π
n2
.
For fi ∈ Rep(ρ), let ωi = ϵ/(7qi − 1). Then for 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1 we define
aˆρmfi = (sinφ cos(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + 4ωi), sinφ sin(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + 4ωi), cosφ),
bˆρmfi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + (8/5)ωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + 8/5ωi), 0) , and
cˆρmfi = (cos(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + 14/3ωi), sin(2π(i− 1)/k+ 7mωi + (14/3)ωi), 0) .
4.1.3. Constructing (partial) preference lists
Using the vectors defined in the previous section, we now examine the preference lists of the men and women of our
constructed instance.
First we will establish that the preference lists of Ai and Ci start with aibρi and ciaσ i, respectively. Since Aˆi and Cˆi have a
z-component that is equal to zero, it is enough to consider the projections of a¯i, b¯i and c¯i on the x-y plane. Furthermore, since
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Aˆi, Cˆi, and the projections of a¯i, b¯i and c¯i are all of unit length, the dot product is essentially a function of the angle between
the two vectors. In other words, if the angle between Aˆi and b¯ is greater than the angle between Aˆi and c¯ , then Aˆi · b¯ < Aˆi · c¯ .
Recalling that Aˆi lies between a¯i and b¯ρi, and is closer to a¯i, then ai will appear first on the preference list of Ai. The women
positioned next to ai on the unit circle are bρi and cσ−1 i. Since the angle between a¯i and c¯σ−1 i is twice the angle between a¯i
and b¯ρi (and Aˆi lies between a¯i and b¯ρi), we see that woman bρi appears second on the preference list of Ai.
Since Cˆi lies between c¯i and a¯σ i and is closer to c¯i, we see that ci will appear first on the preference list of Ci. By construction,
the angle between c¯i and a¯σ i is 4θi. We note that the angle between Cˆi and c¯i is 2/5(4θi) = 8/5 θi and that between Cˆi and
a¯σ i is 3/5(4θi) = 12/5 θi. We consider two cases (i) ci is not the first woman in Wj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, i.e. σ i /∈ Rep(σ ), (ii) ci is
the first woman in someWj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, i.e. σ i = ej for some 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
Case(i) As ci is not the first woman inWj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, the women positioned next to ci are aσ i and bρi where ci ∈ T (σ i)
and bρi ∈ T (i). The angle between (the projection of) b¯ρi and c¯i is the angle between two adjacent T (·)’s, which is one-fourth
of the angle between c¯i and a¯σ i, i.e. 1/4(4θi) = θi. Hence, the angle between Cˆi and bρi is θi + 8/5 θi = 13/5 θi > 12/5 θi.
Hence, aσ i appears second on the preference list of Ci.
Case(ii) As ci is the firstwoman in someWj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, thewomen positioned next to ci are aσ i and bx, where ci, aσ i ∈ Wj
and bx ∈ Wj−1. Note that j− 1 def= l if j = 1. The angle between c¯i and a¯σ i is at most ϵ and the angle between c¯i and b¯x is the
angle betweenWj−1 andWj, which is (2π − lϵ)/l = 2π/l− ϵ > ϵ. Hence, aσ i appears second on the preference list of Ci.
Lastly we examine the preference list of Bi. We will show that the relative order of the b-women on the preference list
of Bi is bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and that Bi prefers b1 over any woman w /∈ {b1, . . . , bn}. This will imply that the
preference list of Bi starts with bnbn−1 · · · b1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The dot product of Bˆi and b¯j is
Bˆi · b¯j = sinφ a¯i · b¯j + cosφ 4j.
Hence, cosφ 4j − sinφ ≤ Bˆi · b¯j ≤ cosφ 4j + sinφ, and
cosφ 4j − φ ≤ Bˆi · b¯j ≤ cosφ 4j + φ.
Comparing Bˆi · b¯j with Bˆi · b¯j+1, we observe that
Bˆi · b¯j ≤ cosφ 4j + φ < cosφ 4j+1 − φ ≤ Bˆi · b¯j+1 (since φ = 2π/100, cosφ > 3/4).
This implies that the relative order of the b-women on the preference list of Bi is bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Next we show that Bi prefers b1 over any womanw /∈ {b1, . . . , bn}. Every womanw /∈ {b1, . . . , bn} lies in the x-y plane.
Hence, it is enough to consider the projection of Bˆi in the plane, which is sinφ a¯i. Comparing Bˆi · b¯1 with Bˆi · a¯x and Bˆi · c¯x for
1 ≤ x ≤ n, we observe that
Bˆi · b¯1 ≥ cosφ 4− φ > (3/4) · 4− φ > 2,
Bˆi · a¯x = sinφ a¯i · a¯x ≤ sinφ ≤ φ < 1 < Bˆi · b¯1, and
Bˆi · c¯x = sinφ a¯i · c¯x ≤ sinφ ≤ φ < 1 < Bˆi · b¯1.
Hence, we have that the preference list of Bi starts with bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Next we show that Bi prefers ai over
any womanw /∈ {ai, b1, . . . , bn}. Comparing Bˆi · a¯i with Bˆi · a¯x, where x ≠ i and Bˆi · c¯j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we find that
Bˆi · a¯i = sinφ a¯i · a¯i = sinφ,
Bˆi · a¯x = sinφ a¯i · a¯x < sinφ = Bˆi · a¯i (since a¯i · a¯x < 1 for i ≠ x), and
Bˆi · c¯x = sinφ a¯i · c¯x < sinφ = Bˆi · a¯i.
Now the preference list of Bi reads bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Finally, we consider two cases — (i) ai is not the last
a-woman in anyWj where 1 ≤ j ≤ l (ii) ai is the last a-woman in someWj where 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
Case (i) Suppose ai ∈ Wj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. As ai is not the last a-woman in Wj, the next a-woman in Wj is aσ i. In
other words, ai ∈ T (i) and aσ i ∈ T (σ i), where T (i) = {cσ−1i, ai, bρi} and T (σ i) = {ci, aσ i, bρσ i}. The angle between c¯σ−1 i and
a¯i is 4θj, and that between a¯i and (the projection of) b¯ρi is 2θj. The angle between b¯ρi and c¯i is the angle between T (i) and
T (σ i), which is θj. Hence, the angle between a¯i and c¯i is 2θj+θj = 3θj. Note that the projection of the b-women onto the unit
circle is irrelevant as they have already been ranked by Bi. Hence, we need only consider the a-women and the c-women.
Given the placement of the preference vector Bˆi, after ai, Bi will prefer either cσ−1 i or ci. Comparing the dot product of Bˆi with
c¯σ−1 i and with c¯i, we get
Bˆi · c¯i = sinφ a¯i · c¯i = sinφ cos 3θj, and
Bˆi · c¯σ−1i = sinφ a¯i · c¯σ−1 i = sinφ cos 4θj < sinφ cos 3θj = Bˆi · c¯i.
Hence, the preference list of Bi reads bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1aici.
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Case (ii) Suppose ai ∈ Wj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , l} and ai is the last a-woman in the group. This implies that ai ∈ T (i) =
{cσ−1i, ai, bρi} and T (i) is the last sub-group of Wj. Since T (i) is the last sub-group of Wj, Wj starts with the sub-group
T (σ i) = {ci, aσ i, bρσ i} followed by T (σ 2i), . . . , T (σ pj−1i), T (σ pj i) = T (i). The angle subtended by the group Wj at the
origin is ϵ and (2π − lϵ)/l is the angle between two adjacent W groups. Hence, comparing the dot product of Bˆi with any
a-woman or c-woman inWj with any a-woman or c-woman fromWx where x ≠ j, we obtain
w1 ∈ Wj, w2 ∈ Wx, x ≠ j, w1, w2 /∈ {b1, . . . , bn}
Bˆi · w¯1 = sinφ a¯i · w¯1 ≥ sinφ cos ϵ, and
Bˆi · w¯2 = sinφ a¯i · w¯2 ≤ sinφ cos((2π − lϵ)/l) < sinφ cos ϵ ≤ Bˆi · w¯1.
We conclude that Bi prefers the a-women and c-women inWj over any a-woman or c-woman in any other group.Within
Wj, the T (·) sub-groups occur in the order T (i), T (σ i), . . . , T (σ pj−1i) and the projection of Bˆi lies inside T (i). We remind the
reader that within T (σmi), where 1 ≤ m ≤ pj, the angle between c¯σm−1 i and a¯σm i is 4θj, the angle between a¯σm i and b¯ρσm i is
2θj, and that between two adjacent T (·)’s is θj, where (7pj − 1)θj = ϵ. This implies that for 1 ≤ m ≤ pj the angle between
a¯σm i and the projection of Bˆi (which is the angle between a¯σm i and a¯i) is (pj − m)7θj. For 1 ≤ m ≤ pj, the angle between
c¯σm−1 i and the projection of Bˆi (which is the angle between c¯σm−1 i and a¯i) is (pj − m)7θj + 4θj = (7(pj − m) + 4)θj. Now
computing the dot product of Bˆi with a¯σm i and c¯σm−1 i, we see that
for 1 ≤ m ≤ pj, θj = ϵ/(7pj − 1), we have
Bˆi · a¯σm i = sinφ a¯i · a¯σm i = sinφ cos(7(pj −m)θj),
Bˆi · c¯σm−1i = sinφ a¯i · c¯σm−1 i = sinφ cos((7(pj −m)+ 4)θj),
Bˆi · c¯σm−1i = sinφ cos((7(pj −m)+ 4)θj) < sinφ cos(7(pj −m)θj)
= Bˆi · a¯σm i, 1 ≤ m ≤ pj, and
Bˆi · a¯σm i = sinφ cos(7(pj −m)θj) < sinφ cos((7(pj −m− 1)+ 4)θj)
= Bˆi · c¯σm i, 1 ≤ m ≤ pj − 1.
Combining the above inequalities and using the fact that i = σ−1ej = σ pj−1ej, we get
Bˆi · c¯i < Bˆi · a¯σ i < Bˆi · c¯σ i < · · · < Bˆi · c¯σ (pj−1) i < Bˆi · a¯σ pj i = Bˆi · a¯i.
Hence, the preference list of Bi is bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1aicσ (pj−1)iaσ (pj−1)i · · · aσ 2icσ iaσ ici.
We remind the reader that ei ∈ Rep(σ ) is a representative element of cycle Di and Wi is partitioned into
T (ei), T (σ ei), . . . , T (σ (pi−1)ei), where the sub-groups are embedded on the unit circle in the order T (ei) through T (σ (pi−1)ei),
with T (σ (pi−1)ei) being the last sub-group in Wi. We now have the initial part of the preference lists of Ai, Ci and Bi. They
are as follows:
for ei ∈ Rep(σ ), (2)
Aσmei : aσmeibρσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1,
Cσ (m−1)ei : cσ (m−1)eiaσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1,
Bσmei : bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1aσmeicσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 2, and
Bσ (pi−1)ei : bnbn−1bn−2 · · · b1aσ (pi−1)eicσ (pi−2)eiaσ (pi−2)ei · · · aσ eiceiaeicσ (pi−1)ei .
The partial preference lists of the women can be obtained by arguments similar to those used for obtaining the men’s
preference lists. The partial preference lists for the women are as follows:
for fi ∈ Rep(ρ), (3)
bρmfi : Aρ(m−1)fiBρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1,
cρmfi : BρmfiCρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1,
aρmfi : CnCn−1 · · · C1BρmfiAρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 2, and
aρ(qi−1)fi : CnCn−1 · · · C1
Bρ(qi−1)fiAρ(qi−2)fiBρ(qi−2)fi · · · Bρ2fiAρfiBρfiAfiBfiAρ(qi−1)fi .
We note that we have not specified the entire preference lists for the men and women. The remaining portion of
each preference list appears after the part that we have given above, and there will never be any stable pairs involving a
man/woman pair that is not shown on the partial preference lists given. The partial lists we have given are sufficient to find
themale- and female-optimalmatchings, and they contain the necessary information to generate all of the stablematchings
for our constructed instance, or equivalently, to find all of the rotations for this instance.
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4.2. Male- and female-optimal matchings
The rest of our analysis will use the partial preference lists in (2) and (3) andwill not otherwise depend upon the position
and preference vectors. In order to re-use our analysis in Section 6, wewill be less specific about themen’s partial preference
lists (2). Let τ be a permutation of {1, . . . , n}. Note that themen’s partial preference lists from (2) correspond to the following
partial preference lists by taking the permutation τ to be the identity permutation.
For ei ∈ Rep(σ ), (4)
Aσmei : aσmeibρσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1,
Cσ (m−1)ei : cσ (m−1)eiaσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1,
Bσmei : bτ(n)bτ(n−1) · · · bτ(1)aσmeicσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 2, and
Bσ (pi−1)ei : bτ(n)bτ(n−1) · · · bτ(1)aσ (pi−1)eicσ (pi−2)eiaσ (pi−2)ei · · · aσ eiceiaeicσ (pi−1)ei .
The rest of our analysis will use the partial preference lists (3) and (4), We will not make any assumptions about the
permutation τ even though, for the purposes of this section, we could assume that it is the identity permutation.
We will find the male-optimal and female-optimal stable matchings using the Gale–Shapley algorithm. Recall that the
order in which themen propose does not matter and any order always leads to themale-optimal matching (provided aman
proposes to the highest-ranked woman (on his preference list) who hasn’t yet rejected him). Therefore, we may suppose
the men propose in the order {A1, . . . , An, C1, . . . , Cn, Bτ(n), . . . , Bτ(1)}.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, men Ai and Ci are paired up with their first choices, women ai and ci respectively, as each of these women
will receive exactly one proposal during the algorithm. Man Bτ(n) is paired with his first choice, woman bτ(n). Man Bτ(n−1)
proposes to woman bτ(n) and gets rejected as woman bτ(n) prefers man Bτ(n) over Bτ(n−1). Man Bτ(n−1) then proposes to
woman bτ(n−1) and gets accepted. In this manner, man Bτ(i)’s proposals to women bτ(n), bτ(n−1), . . . , bτ(i+1) are all rejected
as woman bτ(j), i + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, prefers man Bτ(j) over man Bτ(i). Hence, Bτ(i) is paired up with woman bτ(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Therefore, the male-optimal matching matches men Ai, Ci and Bi with women ai, ci and bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We find the female-optimal matching by reversing the roles of men andwomen. In other words, womenmake proposals
and men accept or reject them. Suppose the women propose in the order {b1, . . . , bn, c1, . . . , cn, aσn, . . . , aσ1}. Women bi
and ci are paired upwith their first choices, namely,men Aρ−1 i and Bi.Woman aσn is pairedwith her first choice, namely,man
Cn. Woman aσ(n−1) proposes to man Cn and gets rejected as man Cn prefers woman aσn over aσ(n−1). Woman aσ(n−1) then
proposes to man Cn−1 and gets accepted. In this manner, woman aσ i’s proposals to men Cn, Cn−1, . . . , Ci+1 are all rejected
as man Cj, i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n, prefers woman aσ j over woman aσ i. Hence, aσ i is paired up with man Ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore,
the female-optimal matching matches women bi,ci and ai with men Aρ−1 i, Bi and Cσ−1 i, respectively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
As is always the case, as we move from the male-optimal to the female-optimal matching (by performing a sequence of
rotations), the men go down their preference lists starting from their male-optimal matching partner (their best possible
partner) and ending at their female-optimal matching partner (their worst possible partner) while the women go up
their preference lists starting from their male-optimal matching partner (their worst) and ending at their female-optimal
matching partner (their best). Hence, amanwill never be pairedwith awomanwho appears either ahead of hismale-optimal
matching partner or after his female-optimal matching partner on his preference list. Similarly, in any stable matching a
womanwill never be pairedwith amanwho appears either ahead of her female-optimalmatching partner or after hermale-
optimal matching partner on her preference list. Hence, the only part of a man’s preference list that we need to consider is
the sub-list that starts at themale-optimalmatching partner and ends at the female-optimalmatching partner. Similarly, for
thewomenweneed to consider the sub-list starting at the female-optimalmatching partner and ending at themale-optimal
matching partner. These sub-lists are typically referred to as their truncated preference lists, and these are as follows:
For ei ∈ Rep(σ ), 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
Aσmei : aσmeibρσmei ,
Cσ (m−1)ei : cσ (m−1)eiaσmei ,
Bτ(j) : bτ(j)bτ(j−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(j)cτ(j), τ (j) ≠ σ pi−1ei
Bτ(j) : bτ(j)bτ(j−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(j)cσ−1τ(j)aσ−1τ(j) · · ·
cστ(j)aστ(j)cτ(j), τ (j) = σ pi−1ei
For fi ∈ Rep(ρ),
bρmfi : Aρ(m−1)fiBρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
cρmfi : BρmfiCρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
aρmfi : Cσ−1(ρmfi)Cσ−1(ρmfi)−1 · · · C1BρmfiAρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 2
aρ(qi−1)fi : Cσ−1(ρ(qi−1)fi)Cσ−1(ρ(qi−1)fi)−1 · · · C1
Bρ(qi−1)fiAρ(qi−2)fiBρ(qi−2)fi · · · Bρ2fiAρfiBρfiAfiBfiAρ(qi−1)fi .
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4.3. Extracting rotations
We first observe that the male-optimal matching and female-optimal matching partners are different for every person.
This implies that each man is involved in at least one rotation and, hence, every man has a well-defined suitor with respect
to the male-optimal stable matching. Also, every man has at least two stable partners. The truncated preference lists of men
Ai and Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are of length two each. Hence, men Ai and Ci are each involved in exactly one rotation. Their suitors in
the male-optimal matchingM0 are SM0(Ai) = bρi and SM0(Ci) = aσ i, respectively.
Note: Throughout this section we useM0 to denote the male-optimal stable matching.
Lemma 8. In a stable matchingM, if Ai is paired with ai, then SM(Ai) = bρi = SM0(Ai).
Proof. The truncated preference lists of man Ai and woman bρi are aibρi and AiBρi, respectively. Since bρi is paired with Bρi
in the male-optimal stable matchingM0, the spouse of bρi inM is a manM∗ ∈ {Ai, Bρi}. Since Ai is paired with ai inM, bρi is
paired with Bρi. Hence, bρi prefers Ai over her partner inM. This, in turn, implies that the suitor of Ai inM, SM(Ai), is bρi. 
Lemma 9. In a stable matchingM, if Ci is paired with ci, then SM(Ci) = aσ i = SM0(Ci).
Proof. The truncated preference list of man Ci is ciaσ i. The truncated preference list of woman aσ i is either
CiCi−1 · · · C1Bσ iAσ i or CiCi−1 · · · C1Bσ iAρ−1σ iBρ−1σ i · · · Aρσ iBρσ iAσ i.
We note that the truncated list of aσ i starts with Ci. InM0, aσ i is paired up with Aσ i. This implies that in the current stable
matchingM, aσ i is paired with amanM∗ who is as high as Aσ i on her preference list. As Ci is paired upwith ci inM,M∗ ≠ Ci.
Hence, in the current stable matchingM, aσ i prefers Ci overM∗. This, in turn, implies that SM(Ci) = aσ i. 
Next we prove that SM0(Bi) = ai.
Lemma 10. The suitor of man Bτ(i) inM0 is SM0(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i).
Proof. The truncated preference list of man Bτ(i) depends on the position of his subscript in the ρ-cycle. But we note that
the initial part of the truncated preference list of Bτ(i) is bτ(i)bτ(i−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(i) for all i. Since our arguments only require
the initial part of the truncated preference list, we do not have to consider separate cases. The spouse of Bτ(i) in M0 is
spM0(Bτ(i)) = bτ(i). Suppose the suitor of Bτ(i) is SM0(Bτ(i)) = bτ(j) for some j, 1 ≤ j < i. This would imply that bτ(j) prefers
Bτ(i) overBτ(j). But the initial part of bτ(j)’s preference list isAρ−1τ(j)Bτ(j) · · · . Hence, bτ(j) prefersBτ(j) overBτ(i). This contradicts
the assumption that SM0(Bτ(i)) = bτ(j). This would imply that SM0(Bτ(i)) ≠ bτ(j) for every j < i. Since aτ(i) is paired up with
Aτ(i) in the male-optimal matchingM0 and aτ(i) prefers Bτ(i) over Aτ(i), SM0(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i). 
The next two lemmas give the suitor of Bi in stable matchings which satisfy certain conditions.
Lemma 11. In a stable matchingM, if Ck is paired with ck for 1 ≤ k ≤ n and Bτ(i) is paired with bτ(i), then SM(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i) =
SM0(Bτ(i)).
Proof. The initial part of the truncated preference list of man Bτ(i) is bτ(i)bτ(i−1) · · · bτ(1) aτ(i). The spouse of Bτ(i) in M is
spM(Bτ(i)) = bτ(i). Suppose the suitor of Bτ(i) is SM(Bτ(i)) = bτ(j) for some j, 1 ≤ j < i. This would imply that bτ(j) prefers
Bτ(i) over Bτ(j). As the initial part of bτ(j)’s preference list is Aρ−1τ(j)Bτ(j) · · · and bτ(j) is paired with Bτ(j) in the male-optimal
stable matching, the partner of bτ(j) in the current matchingM would be a manM∗ who is as high as Bτ(j) on her preference
list. Since bτ(j) prefers Bτ(j) over Bτ(i), bτ(j) would preferM∗ over Bτ(i). This contradicts the assumption that SM(Bτ(i)) = bτ(j).
This would entail that SM(Bτ(i)) ≠ bτ(j) for every j < i.
Next we will show that SM(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i). In the male-optimal stable matching M0, aτ(i) is paired up with Aτ(i). This
implies that in the current stable matchingM, aτ(i) is paired with a manM∗ who is as high as Aτ(i) on her preference list, i.e.
spM(aτ(i)) = M∗. We note that aτ(i)’s truncated preference list is either
Cσ−1(τ (i))Cσ−1(τ (i))−1 · · · C1Bτ(i)Aτ(i) or Cσ−1(τ (i))Cσ−1(τ (i))−1 · · · C1Bτ(i)Aρ−1(τ (i))Bρ−1(τ (i)) · · · Aρτ(i)Bρτ(i)Aτ(i).
The initial part of aτ(i)’s truncated list is Cσ−1(τ (i))Cσ−1(τ (i))−1 · · · C1Bτ(i). As Ck is paired up with ck for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and Bτ(i) is
paired up with bτ(i) in the current matchingM, M∗ /∈ {Cσ−1(τ (i)), Cσ−1(τ (i))−1, . . . C1, Bτ(i)}. Hence, in the current matching
M, aτ(i) prefers Bτ(i) over her partnerM∗. This, in turn, implies that SM(Bτ(i)) = aτ(i). 
Lemma 12. In a stable matchingM, if, for all k, woman ak is paired with man Mk, who is at least as high as Bk on her preference
list, and if Bτ(i) is paired with aτ(i), then SM(Bτ(i)) = cτ(i) = spMt (Bτ(i)), whereMt is the female-optimal stable matching.
Proof. We will consider two cases depending on the preference list of Bτ(i).
Case (i) The truncated preference list of man Bτ(i) is
bτ(i)bτ(i−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(i)cτ(i).
As the truncated preference list of woman cτ(i) is Bτ(i)Cτ(i) and the spouse of cτ(i) in themale-optimal stable matching is Cτ(i),
spM(cτ(i)) ∈ {Bτ(i), Cτ(i)}. As the spouse of Bτ(i) inM is aτ(i) (by assumption), spM(cτ(i)) = Cτ(i). Hence, cτ(i) prefers Bτ(i) over
her partner inM. Therefore, the suitor of Bτ(i) inM, SM(Bτ(i)) = cτ(i).
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Case (ii) The truncated preference list of man Bτ(i) is
bτ(i)bτ(i−1) · · · bτ(1)aτ(i)cσ−1(τ (i))aσ−1(τ (i)) · · · cστ(i)aστ(i)cτ(i).
As the spouse of Bτ(i) inM is aτ(i) (by assumption), and cτ(i) is the partner of Bτ(i) in the female-optimal stable matching,
SM(Bτ(i)) ∈ {cσ−1(τ (i)), aσ−1(τ (i)), . . . cστ(i), aστ(i), cτ(i)}.
Suppose SM(Bτ(i)) = cσ k(τ (i)) ≠ cτ(i). As the initial part of the preference list of woman cσ k(τ (i)) is Bσ k(τ (i))Cσ k(τ (i)), we
see that cσ k(τ (i)) prefers Cσ k(τ (i)) over Bτ(i). As the spouse of cσ k(τ (i)) in the male-optimal stable matching is Cσ k(τ (i)), then
spM(cσ k(τ (i)))
def= M∗ is at least as high as Cσ k(τ (i)) on her preference list. Hence, cσ k(τ (i)) prefers her partner inM over Bτ(i).
Therefore, SM(Bτ(i)) = cσ k(τ (i))(≠ cτ(i)) is not possible.
Suppose SM(Bτ(i)) = aσ k(τ (i)) ≠ aτ(i). The initial part of the truncated preference list of woman aσ k(τ (i)) is
Cσ k−1(τ (i))Cσ k−1(τ (i))−1 · · · C1Bσ k(τ (i)). As the partner of aσ k(τ (i)) in the stable matching M is at least as high as Bσ k(τ (i)), we
have
M∗ ∈ {Cσ k−1(τ (i)), Cσ k(τ (i))−1, . . . , C1, Bσ k(τ (i))}.
Hence, aσ k(τ (i)) prefersM
∗ over Bτ(i). Therefore, SM(Bτ(i)) = aσ k(τ (i))(≠ aτ(i)) is not possible.
Nowwewill show that SM(Bτ(i)) = cτ(i). As the truncated preference list of woman cτ(i) is Bτ(i)Cτ(i) and the spouse of cτ(i)
in the male-optimal stable matching is Cτ(i), spM(cτ(i)) ∈ {Bτ(i), Cτ(i)}. As the spouse of Bτ(i) inM is aτ(i), spM(cτ(i)) = Cτ(i).
Hence, cτ(i) prefers Bτ(i) over her partner inM. Therefore, the suitor of Bτ(i) inM, SM(Bτ(i)) = cτ(i). 
We will later observe that a stable matching obtained after performing a set of ρ-rotations satisfies conditions laid out
in Lemmas 8 and 11. Hence, the above lemmas help in establishing the suitors of A-men and B-men in the stable matchings
obtained after performing ρ-rotations.
We note that the Find-All-Rotations algorithm obtains all the rotations of the instance irrespective of whatever
ordering of the men we use in that procedure (to initialize the first proposal to his suitor). We order the men as follows:
{A1, . . . , An, C1, . . . , Cn, B1, . . . , Bn}. In the male-optimal matching M0, A1 is paired with a1. Find-All-Rotations starts
with man A1 whose suitor is bρ1. The sequence in that algorithm starts with the pair (A1, a1). As bρ1 is the suitor of
A1, the next pair in the sequence is (spM0(bρ1), bρ1) = (Bρ1, bρ1). With aρ1 being the suitor of Bρ1, the next pair is
(spM0(aρ1), aρ1) = (Aρ1, aρ1). The pair (Aρ1, aρ1) results in (Bρ21, bρ21). In this manner, we grow the sequence (A1, a1),
(Bρ1, bρ1), (Aρ1, aρ1), (Bρ2, bρ2), . . .. As the suitor of Ai is bρi and that of Bi is ai, we observe that the sequence alternates
between A-men and B-men. We also note that the pair (A1, a1) results in the pair (Aρ1, aρ1) and the pair (Bρ1, bρ1) results in
(Bρ21, aρ21). In other words, the subscripts of the A-men and the B-men involved in the above sequence are from a ρ-cycle,
in particular, the ρ-cycle containing 1. Suppose the ρ-cycle containing 1 is of size p1, that is, the ρ-cycle containing 1 is
(1, 2, . . . , p1). Then the sequence we end up with is
{(A1, a1), (Bρ1, bρ1), (Aρ1, aρ1), . . . , (Bρp1−11, bρp1−11), (Aρp1−11, aρp1−11), (Bρp11, bρp11)}
= {(A1, a1), (B2, b2), (A2, a2), . . . , (Bp1 , bp1), (Ap1 , ap1), (B1, b1)},
using that (Bρp11, bρp11) = (B1, b1). Lemma 11 tells us this ends the sequence in the Find-All-Rotations algorithm, and we
have therefore found a rotation.
(Note: If we start with any Ai or Bi, with i ∈ (1, 2, . . . , p1), we will discover the same rotation, as the resulting sequence
we find is a cyclic shift of the one given above.)
After applying the above ρ-rotation, Ai is paired with bρi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ p1), his partner in the female-optimal matching.
Hence, in this new stable matching, the men A1, . . . , Ap1 do not have suitors and will therefore not participate in future
rotations. We also note that the only men who changed their partners in the above rotation were A-men and B-men with
subscripts in the ρ-cycle containing 1. Hence, Ck is still paired up with ck for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and Ai and Bi are paired up with ai
and bi, respectively, when the subscript i does not belong to the ρ-cycle containing 1.
Let M1 denote this new matching after applying this first ρ-cycle we have discovered. We note that M1 satisfies the
conditions laid out in Lemmas 8 and 11, which, in turn, tells us that SM1(Ai) = bρi and SM1(Bi) = ai for i /∈ {1, 2, . . . , p1}.
Find-All-Rotations then picks the next man who has a well-defined suitor, namely Ap1+1, whose suitor is SM1(Ap1+1) =
bρ(p1+1), and constructs the next rotation. From the above exercise of constructing a rotation corresponding to a ρ-cycle, it
is clear that the rotation containing man Ap1+1 will be a ρ-rotation involving A-men and B-men whose subscripts belong to
the ρ-cycle that contains p1+1. Proceeding in thismanner, we obtain all rotations (ρ-rotations) involvingmen Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Every Bi will participate in exactly one ρ-rotation as every i ∈ [n], belongs to exactly one cycle of the permutation ρ.
After applying all the ρ-rotations, we will obtain a stable matching, sayM′, in which the spouses of men Ai, Bi and Ci are
bρi, ai, and ci, respectively. As was observed before, all the A-men are paired up with their partners from the female-optimal
stable matching. Thus, none of the A-men will participate in any of the future rotations. As was also noted, the C-men each
participate in exactly one rotation and the suitor of Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is aσ i as long as Ci is paired with ci in the stable matching.
From Lemma 12, it follows that the suitor of Bi inM′ is ci. All of the B-men and C-men have well-defined suitors.
The nextman picked by Find-All-Rotations is C1 whose suitor is aσ i. The sequence startswith the pair (Ci, ci). As aσ i is the
suitor of Ci, the next pair in the sequence is (spM′(aσ i), aσ i) = (Bσ i, aσ i). Similarly, as the suitor of Bσ i is cσ i, the next pair in the
sequence is (spM′(cσ i), cσ i) = (Cσ i, cσ i). Continuing from (Cσ i, cσ i), we get the pair (Bσ 2 i, aσ 2i). Proceeding in thismanner,we
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generate the rotation.Wenote that the suitor of Bi is ci and that of Ci is aσ i, thereby forcing us to alternate between C-men and
B-men.We also note that the pair (Ci, ci) eventually results in the pair (Cσ i, cσ i) and (Bσ i, aσ i) resulted in the pair (Bσ 2 i, aσ 2i).
In otherwords, the subscripts of theC-men and the B-men in the rotation are governed by aσ -cycle, in particular, theσ -cycle
containing 1. Suppose the σ -cycle containing 1 is of size q1, that is, the σ -cycle containing 1 is (1, σ1, . . . , σ q1−11). Then the
rotation we end up with is {(C1, c1), (Bσ1, aσ1), (Cσ1, cσ1), . . . , (Bσ q1−11, aσ q1−11), (Cσ q1−11, cσ q1−11), (Bσ q11, aσ q11)}, where
(Bσ q11, aσ q11) = (B1, a1).
After performing the above σ -rotation, for 0 ≤ k ≤ q1 − 1, Cσ k1, is paired with aσ k+11, his partner in the female-optimal
matching. Hence, men C1, . . . , Cσ q1−11 no longer have suitors and will not participate in any future rotations. We note that
the only men who changed their partners in the above rotation were C-men and B-men with subscripts in the σ -cycle
containing 1. Hence, Ak is still paired with bρk for k ∈ [n], and Ci and Bi are paired up with ci and ai, respectively, when the
subscript i does not belong to the σ -cycle containing 1.
Let M′1 denote the new matching after applying this σ -rotation. We note that M
′
1 satisfies the conditions laid out in
Lemmas 9 and 12,which, in turn, entails that SM′1(Ci) = aσ i and SM′1(Bi) = ci for i /∈ {1, σ1, . . . , σ q1−11}. Find-All-Rotations
picks the next man who has a well-defined suitor, say Ci1 , where
i1 = min{i : Ci is paired with ci inM′1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
and constructs a new rotation. The suitor of Ci1 is SM′1(Ci1) = aσ i1 . From the above exercise of constructing a rotation
corresponding to a σ -cycle, it is clear that the rotation containing man Ci1 will be a σ -rotation involving C-men and B-men
whose subscripts belong to the σ -cycle containing i1. Proceeding in this manner, we obtain all σ -rotations involvingmen Ci,
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Each Bi will participate in exactly one σ -rotation, as every i ∈ [n] belongs to exactly one cycle of the permutation
σ .
After applying all the σ -rotations, we have a stable matching, sayM′′, in which the spouses of men Ai, Bi and Ci are bρi,
ci, and aσ i, respectively. All the men are paired up with their partners from the female-optimal stable matching. Hence,
M′′ = Mt , where Mt is the female-optimal stable matching. Therefore we do not have any further rotations to extract.
Hence, the only rotations in the rotation poset of the stable matching instance are the rotations governed by the ρ- and
σ -cycles, namely ρ-rotations and σ -rotations. Therefore, the only stable pairs of the instance are (Ai, ai), (Ai, bρi), (Bi, bi),
(Bi, ai), (Bi, ci), (Ci, ci), and (Ci, aσ i) for i ∈ [n].
We still have to prove that the ρ-rotations correspond to vertices in V1 and the σ -rotations correspond to vertices in V2.
We prove this fact in the next section.
4.4. Ordering rotations
In this section, we compare rotations using the explicitly precedes relation as in Definition 3.6.
Recalling Definition 3.5, it follows that a man-woman pair (M, w) can be eliminated if and only if there exist stable pairs
(M1, w) and (M2, w) such that w prefers M1 over M and M appears as high as M2 on w’s preference list. In other words,
a man-woman pair (M, w) can be eliminated if and only if M appears on the truncated preference list of w and is not the
partner ofw in the female-optimal stable matching. This identifies all the man-woman pairs eliminated by rotations of the
instance.
Recall from the previous section that the only stable pairs of the matching instance are (Ai, ai), (Ai, bρi), (Bi, bi), (Bi, ai),
(Bi, ci), (Ci, ci), (Ci, aσ i) for i ∈ [n]. Of these stable pairs, (Ai, bρi), (Bi, ci) and (Ci, aσ i) are pairs in the female-optimal stable
matching. Hence, the only stable pairs that are eliminated by rotations are (Ai, ai), (Bi, bi), (Bi, ai) and (Ci, ci) for i ∈ [n]. We
list all the eliminated pairs below and highlight those that are stable.
For fi ∈ Rep(ρ),
bρmfi : Bρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
cρmfi : Cρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
aρmfi : Cσ−1(ρmfi−1) · · · C1BρmfiAρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 2
aρ(qi−1)fi : Cσ−1(ρ(qi−1)fi−1) · · · Cσ−11Bρ(qi−1)fiAρ(qi−2)fiBρ(qi−2)fi · · · Bρ2fiAρfiBρfiAρ(qi−1)fi
In Definition 3.6, rotation R eliminates pair (M, w) and rotation R′ moves man M to woman w′ such that M prefers w
overw′. Hence, womanw and manM belong to rotations R and R′, respectively.
Lemma 13. Suppose R′ is a ρ-rotation. Then there does not exist a rotation R which explicitly precedes R′. Therefore, every
ρ-rotation is a minimal element of the rotation poset.
Proof. Suppose there exists a rotation Rwhich explicitly precedes
R′ = {(Bj, bj), (Aj, aj), (Bj+1, bj+1), (Aj+1, aj+1), . . . , (Bj+q−1, bj+q−1), (Aj+q−1, aj+q−1)}.
We consider two cases — (I) R is a ρ-rotation, (II) R is a σ -rotation.
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Case (I) Suppose R is a ρ-rotation where
R = {(Bi, bi), (Ai, ai), (Bi+1, bi+1), (Ai+1, ai+1), . . . , (Bi+p−1, bi+p−1), (Ai+p−1, ai+p−1)}.
The ρ-cycles corresponding to rotations R and R′ are (i, i+1, . . . , i+p−1) and (j, j+1, . . . , j+q−1). Since any two ρ-cycles
are disjoint, the corresponding ρ-rotations are disjoint, i.e. ρ-rotations R and R′ do not share either a man or a woman. Since
R explicitly precedes R′, there exists a man-woman pair (M, w)withM belonging to rotation R′ andw belonging to rotation
R such that R eliminates the pair (M, w) and R′ movesM to a womanw′ beloww on his list. In other words, there exist
a manM ∈ {Bj, Bj+1, . . . , Bj+q−1, Aj, Aj+1, . . . , Aj+q−1}, and
a womanw ∈ {bi, bi+1, . . . , bi+p−1, ai, ai+1, . . . , ai+p−1}
satisfying the above property. We consider a set of sub-cases, depending upon possible values ofM andw.
Subcase (I-a) (M, w) ∈ {(Bx, by), (Ax, by)}. We note that x ≠ y, and x and y are from different ρ-cycles. From the table
of eliminated pairs, we note that the set of eliminated pairs involving woman by is {(By, by)}. Hence, (M, w) ≠ (Bx, by) and
(M, w) ≠ (Ax, by).
Subcase (I-b) (M, w) = (Ax, ay). We again note that x ≠ y, and x and y are from different ρ-cycles. We also note that
woman ay could have one of two possible preference lists, which is reflected in the table of eliminated pairs. After performing
rotation R, woman ay is paired upwith By. Hence, the set of pairs eliminated by rotation R involvingwoman ay could be either
S = {(Ay, ay)} or
T = {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Bρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}.
Since we are only interested in eliminated pairs that involve an A-man, we consider subsets of S and T containing
A-men, which are {(Ay, ay)} and {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Aρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}, respectively. We note that every element
of {ρ−1y, ρ−2y, . . . , ρy, y} belongs to the ρ-cycle containing y. Since x ≠ y and x and y are from different ρ-cycles,
(Ax, ay) /∈ {(Ay, ay)} and (Ax, ay) /∈ {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Aρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}. Hence, (M, w) ≠ (Ax, ay).
Subcase (I-c) (M, w) = (Bx, ay). As before, x ≠ y and x, and y are from different ρ-cycles. From the table of eliminated
pairs, we note that the set of eliminated pairs involving woman ay could be either
S = {(Ay, ay)} or
T = {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Bρy, ay), (Ay, ay)}.
Since we are only interested in eliminated pairs that involve a B-man, we consider subsets of S and T containing
B-men, which are ∅ and {(By, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Bρy, ay)}, respectively. We note that every element of
{y, ρ−1y, ρ−2y, . . . , ρy} belongs to the ρ-cycle containing y. Since x ≠ y and x and y are from different ρ-cycles,
(Bx, ay) /∈ {(By, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Bρy, ay)}
and (Bx, ay) /∈ ∅ (vacuously). Hence, (M, w) ≠ (Bx, ay).
Therefore, if R explicitly precedes R′, then R is not a ρ-rotation.
Case (II) Suppose R is a σ -rotation where
R = {(Bi, ai), (Ci, ci), (Bσ i, aσ i), (Cσ i, cσ i), . . . , (Bσ p−1 i, aσ p−1i), (Cσ p−1i, cσ p−1 i)}.
The σ - and ρ-cycles corresponding to rotations R and R′ are σ1 = (i, σ i, . . . , σ p−1i) and ρ1 = (j, j + 1, . . . , j + q −
1), respectively. Since R explicitly precedes R′, there exists a man-woman pair (M, w) with M belonging to rotation
R′ and w belonging to rotation R such that R eliminates the pair (M, w) and R′ moves M to a woman w′ below w
on his list. In other words, there exist a man M ∈ {Bj, Bj+1, . . . , Bj+q−1, Aj, Aj+1, . . . , Aj+q−1} and a woman w ∈
{ai, aσ i, . . . , aσ p−1 i, ci, cσ i, . . . , cσ p−1i} satisfying the above property. Once again, there are a set of sub-cases to consider.
Subcase (II-a) (M, w) ∈ {(Bx, cy), (Ax, cy)}. From the table of eliminated pairs, we note that the set of eliminated pairs
involving woman cy is {(Cy, cy)}. Hence, (M, w) ≠ (Bx, cy) and (M, w) ≠ (Ax, cy).
Subcase (II-b) (M, w) ∈ {(Bx, ay), (Ax, ay)}. We note that after performing rotation R′, woman ay is paired up with By.
Hence, the pair (By, ay) cannot be an eliminated pair. This implies that when the eliminated pair (M, w) is of the form
(Bx, ay), the subscript x cannot assume the value y. We observe that even though woman ay could have one of two possible
preference lists, the initial part of her preference list stays the same. We note that before performing the rotation Rwoman
ay is paired up with man By. After performing the rotation R, woman ay is paired up with Cσ−1y. Hence, the pairs eliminated
by rotation R that involve woman ay are {(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)}. Since
{(Bx, ay), (Ax, ay)} ∩ {(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)} = ∅,
we see (M, w) ≠ (Bx, ay) and (M, w) ≠ (Ax, ay).
Therefore, if R explicitly precedes R′, then R cannot be a σ -rotation.
From cases (I) and (II), we conclude that a ρ-rotation cannot be explicitly preceded either by another ρ-rotation or a
σ -rotation. Therefore, every ρ-rotation is a minimal element in the rotation poset. 
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Lemma 14. Suppose R is a σ -rotation. Then there does not exist a rotation R′ such that R explicitly precedes R′. Therefore, every
σ -rotation is a maximal element of the rotation poset.
Proof. Suppose there exists a rotation Rwhich explicitly precedes R′. We consider two cases.
Case (I) R′ is a ρ-rotation. This case has been dealt with in case (II) of Lemma 13.
Case(II) R′ is a σ -rotation. Let
R = {(Bi, ai), (Ci, ci), (Bσ i, aσ i), (Cσ i, cσ i), . . . , (Bσ p−1i, aσ p−1 i)(Cσ p−1 i, cσ p−1 i)},
and
R′ = {(Bj, aj), (Cj, cj), (Bσ j, aσ j), (Cσ j, cσ j), . . . , (Bσ q−1j, aσ q−1j), (Cσ q−1j, cσ q−1j)}.
The σ -cycles corresponding to rotations R and R′ are (i, σ i, . . . , σ p−1i) and (j, σ j, . . . , σ q−1j). Since any two σ -cycles are
disjoint, the corresponding σ -rotations are disjoint, i.e. σ -rotations R and R′ do not share either a man or a woman. As has
been observed before, the implication of R explicitly preceding R′ is that there exists a man–woman pair (M, w) with M
belonging to rotation R′ and w belonging to rotation R such that R eliminates the pair (M, w) and R′ moves M to a woman
w′ beloww on his list. In other words, there exist
a manM ∈ {Bj, Bσ j, . . . , Bσ q−1j, Cj, Cσ j, . . . , Cσ q−1j} and
a womanw ∈ {ai, aσ i, . . . , aσ p−1 i, ci, cσ i, . . . , cσ p−1 i}
satisfying the above property. As the pair (M, w) has a set of possibilities, we consider a set of sub-cases.
Subcase (II-a) (M, w) ∈ {(Bx, cy), (Cx, cy)}. We note that x ≠ y, and x and y are from different σ -cycles. From the table
of eliminated pairs, we note that the set of eliminated pairs involving woman cy is {(Cy, cy)}. Hence, (M, w) ≠ (Bx, cy) and
(M, w) ≠ (Cx, cy).
Subcase (II-b) (M, w) = (Bx, ay). As before, we note that x ≠ y and x and y are from different σ -cycles. We also note
that the spouses of woman ay before and after performing the rotation R are By and Cσ−1y, respectively. Hence, the pairs
eliminated by rotation R are
{(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)}.
As x ≠ y, (Bx, ay) /∈ {(Cσ−1(y−1), ay), (Cσ−1(y−2), ay), . . . , (Cσ−11, ay), (By, ay)}. Therefore, (M, w) ≠ (Bx, ay).
Subcase (II-c) (M, w) = (Cx, ay). We note that x and y are from different σ -cycles. We also note that the spouses of
woman ay before and after performing the rotation R are By and Cσ−1y, respectively. Hence, the pairs eliminated by rotation
R are
{(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)}.
Suppose (Cx, ay) ∈ {(Cσ−1(y)−1, ay), (Cσ−1(y)−2, ay), . . . , (C1, ay), (By, ay)}. This implies x ∈ {σ−1(y) − 1, σ−1(y) −
2, . . . , 1}. Recalling that the only stable pairs are (Ai, ai), (Ai, bρi), (Bi, bi), (Bi, ai), (Bi, ci), (Ci, ci), (Ci, aσ i) for i ∈ [n], we
see that (Cx, ay) is an unstable pair as x ≠ σ−1y. Therefore, every pair of the form (Cx, ay) that rotation R eliminates is an
unstable pair. Since R explicitly precedes R′ and the pairs of the form (Cx, ay) eliminated by R are unstable, rotation R′ has to
move some Cx below ay on his list. The initial part of the preference list of Cx is cxaσ x for all x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. In other words,
Cx has aσ x above ay for all y ≠ σ x. After performing rotation R′, Cx moves from cx to aσ x for every x ∈ {j, σ j, . . . , σ q−1j}.
Therefore, rotation R′ does not take Cx below ay on his preference list for x ∈ {j, σ j, . . . , σ q−1j}. Therefore, (M, w) ≠ (Cx, ay).
Putting together cases (I) and (II), we conclude that if R is a σ -rotation, then it cannot explicitly precede any rotation R′.
This, in turn, implies that every σ -rotation is a maximal element in the rotation poset. 
From Lemmas 13 and 14, it follows that the rotation poset of our constructed matching instance is of height at most 1.
Lemma 15. Suppose R is a ρ-rotation and R′ is a σ -rotation. Then R explicitly precedes R′ if and only if R and R′ have a common
man. In other words, the ρ and σ -cycles corresponding to R and R′, respectively, have an element in common.
Proof. Let
R = {(Bi, bi), (Ai, ai), (Bi+1, bi+1), (Ai+1, ai+1), . . . , (Bi+p−1, bi+p−1), (Ai+p−1, ai+p−1)}
and
R′ = {(Bj, aj), (Cj, cj), (Bσ j, aσ j), (Cσ j, cσ j), . . . , (Bσ q−1j, aσ q−1j), (Cσ q−1j, cσ q−1j)}.
Suppose R and R′ do not have a common man, i.e.
{Bi, Bi+1, . . . , Bi+p−1} ∩ {Bj, Bσ j, . . . , Bσ q−1j} = ∅.
This, in turn, entails that ρ1∩σ1 = ∅, where ρ1 = {i, i+1, . . . , i+p−1} and σ1 = {j, σ j, . . . , σ q−1j}. As has been observed
before, the implication of R explicitly preceding R′ is that there exists a man–woman pair (M, w) with M belonging to
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rotation R′ andw belonging to rotation R such that R eliminates the pair (M, w) and R′ movesM to a womanw′ beloww on
his list. In other words, there exist
a manM ∈ {Bj, Bσ j, . . . , Bσ q−1j, Cj, Cσ j, . . . , Cσ q−1j} and
a womanw ∈ {bi, bi+1, . . . , bi+p−1, ai, ai+1, . . . , ai+p−1}
satisfying the above property. We consider a set of sub-cases.
Case (I) (M, w) ∈ {(Bx, by), (Cx, by)}. We note that x ≠ y, as ρ1 ∩ σ1 = ∅ and x ∈ σ1 and y ∈ ρ1. From the
table of eliminated pairs, we note that the set of eliminated pairs involving woman by is {(By, by)}. Hence, (M, w) ∉
{(Bx, by), (Cx, by)}.
Case (II) (M, w) ∈ {(Bx, ay), (Cx, ay)}. We note that ay could have one of two possible preference lists, which is reflected
in the table of eliminated pairs.
The spouses of ay before and after performing the rotation R are Ay and By, respectively. Hence, the set of pairs eliminated
by rotation R involvingwoman ay could be either S = {(Ay, ay)} or T = {(Aρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−1y, ay), . . . , (Aρy, ay), (Bρy, ay), (Ay,
ay)}. Since none of the eliminated pairs involve a C-man, (M, w) ≠ (Cx, ay).
With (Cx, ay) eliminated from being a possible candidate, we are only interested in eliminated pairs that involve a B-man.
We consider subsets of S and T containing B-men, which are ∅ and {(Bρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Bρy, ay)}, respectively. We
note that every element of ρ1 = {ρ−1y, ρ−2y, . . . , ρy, y} = {i, i + 1, . . . , i + p − 1} belongs to the ρ-cycle containing
y. As σ1 and ρ1 do not have an element in common, x ≠ y and x does not belong to the ρ-cycle containing y. Therefore,
(Bx, ay) /∈ {(Bρ−1y, ay), (Bρ−2y, ay), . . . , (Bρy, ay)}. Hence, (M, w) ≠ (Bx, ay).
From cases (I) and (II), it follows that if R and R′ do not share a common man, then there does not exist a man–woman
pair (M, w) such that R eliminates (M, w) and R′ movesM tow′ beloww. Hence, R does not explicitly precede R′.
Suppose rotations R and R′ have a common man. In other words,
{Bi, Bi+1, . . . , Bi+p−1} ∩ {Bj, Bσ j, . . . , Bσ q−1j} ≠ ∅.
This, in turn, entails that ρ1 ∩ σ1 ≠ ∅, where ρ1 = {i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ p− 1} and σ1 = {j, σ j, . . . , σ q−1j}. We also note that a
ρ-cycle and a σ -cycle can have at most one element in common. Therefore, {Bi, Bi+1, . . . , Bi+p−1} ∩ {Bj, Bσ j, . . . , Bσ q−1j} ={Bl}, say.
As has been observed before, in order to establish that R explicitly precedes R′, it is enough to produce a man–woman
pair (M, w) with M belonging to rotation R′ and w belonging to rotation R such that R eliminates the pair (M, w) and
R′ moves M to a woman w′ below w on his list. In other words, it is enough to show that there exist a man M ∈
{Bj, Bσ j, . . . , Bσ q−1j, Cj, Cσ j, . . . , Cσ q−1j} and a woman w ∈ {bi, bi+1, . . . , bi+p−1, ai, ai+1 . . . , ai+p−1} satisfying the above
property. We show that the pair (Bl, bl) is the required pair.
Since Bl participates in the rotation R, the spouses of Bl before and after the rotation R are bl and al, respectively. Hence,
the pair (Bl, bl) is eliminated by R, and R moves Bl to al, which is below bl. Since Bl belongs to R′, the spouses of Bl before
and after performing the rotation R′ are al and cl, respectively. Hence, R′ moves Bl to cl, which is below al. This entails that
rotation R′ moves Bl to cl, which is below bl on his preference list. Therefore, R eliminates the pair (Bl, bl) and R′ moves Bl to
the woman cl who is below al on Bl’s preference list. This implies that R explicitly precedes R′.
Hence, it follows that if R and R′ share a man, then R explicitly precedes R′. This proves the lemma. 
From Lemma 15, it follows that the rotation poset has an edge from aρ-rotation to a σ -rotation (i.e. ρ ≤ σ in the ordering
of the rotations) if and only if the rotations share a common man. Hence, the rotation poset has height 1. In other words,
the rotation poset has an edge between two vertices if and only if the cycles corresponding to the vertices have an element
in common. The edges of the bipartite graph, which was introduced early on, were defined in a similar fashion. Hence, the
rotation poset when considered as a graph is isomorphic to a bipartite graph.
5. The 1-attribute case
In this section we concentrate our attention on the 1-attribute model. This case is very special and we establish the
following result.
Theorem 2. #SM(1-attribute) is solvable in polynomial time.
Theorem 2 is obtained as a corollary of the following theorem.
Theorem 16. In the 1-attribute model, the rotation poset of a stable matching instance is (isomorphic to) a path.
Theorem 2 follows as it is straightforward to count the downsets of a path. We establish Theorem 16 through a series of
lemmas.
First, we observe that in the 1-attribute model the men have only two possible preference lists for the women. The two
preference lists are such that one is the reverse of the other. Similarly, the women have only two possible preference lists,
one being the reverse of the other.
We start by establishing that every rotation in the 1-attributemodel is of even size. In otherwords, every rotation involves
an even number of men.
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Lemma 17. In the 1-attribute model, every rotation is of even size, and the preference lists of the men (and, similarly, the women)
involved in the rotation alternate.
Proof. Weestablish the statement by showing that two consecutivemen in a rotation cannot both have the same preference
list. Then, since there are only two possible preference lists and the preference lists of any two consecutive men have to be
different, we conclude that the number of men involved in the rotation has to be even.
Suppose we have a rotation R of size k. Without loss of generality (by relabeling), we assume this rotation is
(B0, b0), (B1, b1), . . . , (Bk−1, bk−1). Eachman Bi ismarried towoman bi (inM1) before the rotation, and towoman bi+1 (mod k)
(inM2) after the rotation, as shown in the table below.
Men (Before R) (After R)
M1 M2
B0 b0 b1
B1 b1 b2
...
Bi bi bi+1
Bi+1 bi+1 bi+2
...
Bk−2 bk−2 bk−1
Bk−1 bk−1 b0
Before we proceed, we note that all subscripts that follow are computed mod k.
To establish our result it is enough to show that two consecutivemen in a rotation cannot both have the same preference
lists.
So, suppose to the contrary that men Bi and Bi+1 have the same preference list. Recalling that the rotation is female-
improving, the preference list of Bi and Bi+1 are shown below.
Bi | · · · bi · · · bi+1
Bi+1 | · · · bi+1 · · · bi+2
Since Bi and Bi+1 have the same preference lists, bi comes ahead of bi+1 on Bi+1’s preference list, as shown below.
Bi | · · · bi · · · bi+1
Bi+1 | · · · bi · · · bi+1 · · · bi+2
AsM1 is a stable matching, the pair (Bi+1, bi)must not form a blocking pair to the stable pairs (Bi, bi) and (Bi+1, bi+1) in
M1. Since bi comes ahead of bi+1 on Bi+1’s list, Bi+1 must appear after Bi on bi’s preference list to ensure that (Bi+1, bi) does
not form such a blocking pair. Therefore, the preference lists for man Bi+1 and woman bi are as follows.
Bi+1 | · · · bi · · · bi+1 · · · bi+2 | bi | · · · Bi−1 · · · Bi · · · Bi+1
Comparing the preference lists of women bi and bi+1,
bi | · · · Bi−1 · · · Bi · · · Bi+1
bi+1 | · · · Bi · · · Bi+1 · · ·
we note that they are the same. Hence, woman bi+1 also has Bi−1 ahead of Bi on her list.
bi | · · · Bi−1 · · · Bi · · · Bi+1
bi+1 | · · · Bi−1 · · · Bi · · · Bi+1 · · ·
Because M2 is also a stable matching and Bi−1 is ahead of Bi on bi+1’s preference list, bi+1 must appear after bi on Bi−1’s
preference list to prevent (Bi−1, bi+1) from being a blocking pair in M2. Comparing the preference lists of Bi−1, Bi and Bi+1,
we note that
Bi−1 | · · · bi−1 · · · bi · · · bi+1
Bi | · · · bi · · · bi+1
Bi+1 | · · · bi · · · bi+1 · · · bi+2
they are all the same.
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We have shown that man Bi−1 has the same preference list as men Bi and Bi+1, and that women bi and bi+1 both have the
same preference list. We can now repeat the argument with men Bi−1 and Bi to conclude that men Bi−2 and Bi−1 have the
same preference list and women bi−1 and bi have the same preference list and so on. In this fashion, we can show that all
men involved in the rotation have the same preference list and so do all the women involved.
We know that the men involved in a rotation get less happy with their partners as a result of applying the rotation. Since
themen all have the same preference lists, the relative order of women b1 through bk should be the same. Suppose the order
is bi1 , bi2 , . . . , bik . After the rotation, the man married to bi1 would go down his list and the man married to bik would go up
his list, which cannot both happen at the same time. Hence, we cannot have a rotation if some two consecutive men on the
rotation have the same preference lists.
Therefore, the preference lists of the men involved in the rotation have to alternate, forcing the rotation to be of even
size. 
Lemma 18. In the 1-attribute model, every rotation is of size 2.
Proof. Suppose we have a rotation of size 2k involving men B0, B1, . . . , B2k−1 and women b0, b1, . . . , b2k−1, where k > 1.
Every man Bi is married to woman bi before the rotation and to woman bi+1 (mod k) after the rotation, as shown in the table
below.
Men Before After
B0 b0 b1
B1 b1 b2
...
Bi bi bi+1
Bi+1 bi+1 bi+2
...
B2k−2 b2k−2 b2k−1
B2k−1 b2k−1 b0
Since men Bi with i even have the same preference lists, the relative order of women on their lists is the same. Suppose
the order is bi1 , bi2 , . . . , bi2k . Since, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k− 1, b2i is ahead of b2i+1, it is clear that i1 is even.
Consider men Bi1−2, Bi1−1, and Bi1 . Note that we are implicitly using the assumption that k > 1 (otherwise there are not
three distinct men). Their preference lists appear as follows.
Bi1−2 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1−2 · · · bi1−1
Bi1−1 | · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1
Bi1 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1+1
As all pairs (Bj, bj) are part of a stable matching, the pair (Bi1−2, bi1) should not form a blocking pair to the stable pairs
(Bi1−2, bi1−2) and (Bi1 , bi1). Since bi1 comes ahead of bi1−2 on Bi1−2’s list, Bi1−2 should appear after Bi1 on bi1 ’s preference list
to ensure that (Bi1−2, bi1) does not form a blocking pair. The preference lists for women bi1 and woman bi1+1 are as follows.
bi1 | · · · Bi1−1 · · · Bi1 · · · Bi1−2 · · ·
bi1+1 | · · · Bi1−2 · · · Bi1 · · · Bi1+1 · · ·
Note that Bi1−2 appears ahead of Bi1 on bi1+1’s list as the lists of bi1 and bi1+1 are reverses of each other.
Again, all pairs (Bj, bj+1) are part of a stable matching and (Bi1−2, bi1+1) could form a blocking pair to the stable pairs
(Bi1−2, bi1−1) and (Bi1 , bi1+1). Since Bi1−2 is ahead of Bi1 on bi1+1’s preference list, bi1+1 has to appear after bi1−1 on Bi1−2’s
preference list to prevent (Bi1−2, bi1+1) from becoming a blocking pair. The preference lists of Bi1−2, Bi1−1 and Bi1 are as
follows.
Bi1−2 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1−2 · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1+1
Bi1−1 | · · · bi1+1 · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1 · · ·
Bi1 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1+1 · · ·
Note that bi1+1 appears ahead of bi1−1 on Bi1−1’s list, as the lists of Bi1−2 and Bi1−1 are reverses of each other.
The pair (Bi1−1, bi1+1) should not forma blocking pair to the stable pairs (Bi1−1, bi1−1) and (Bi1+1, bi1+1). Since bi1+1 comes
ahead of bi1−1 on Bi1−1’s list, Bi1−1 should appear after Bi1+1 on bi1+1’s preference list to ensure that (Bi1−1, bi1+1) does not
form a blocking pair. The preference lists for women bi1 and woman bi1+1 are as follows.
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bi1 | · · · Bi1−1 · · · Bi1 · · · Bi1−2 · · ·
bi1+1 | · · · Bi1−2 · · · Bi1 · · · Bi1+1 · · · Bi1−1
bi1+2 | · · · Bi1−1 · · · Bi1+1 · · · Bi1+2 · · ·
Note that Bi1−1 appears ahead of Bi1+1 on bi1+2’s list, as the lists of bi1+1 and bi1+2 are reverses of each other.
Similarly, (Bi1−1, bi1+2)must not be a blocking pair to the stable pairs (Bi1−1, bi1) and (Bi1+1, bi1+2). Since Bi1−1 is ahead of
Bi1+1 on bi1+2’s preference list, bi1+2 has to appear after bi1 on Bi1−1’s preference list to prevent (Bi1−1, bi1+2) from becoming
a blocking pair. The preference lists of Bi1−2, Bi1−1 and Bi1 are as follows.
Bi1−2 | · · · bi1 · · · bi1−2 · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1+1
Bi1−1 | · · · bi1+1 · · · bi1−1 · · · bi1 · · · bi1+2 · · ·
Bi1 | · · · bi1+2 · · · bi1 · · · bi1+1 · · ·
Note that bi1+2 appears ahead of bi1 on Bi1 ’s list, as the lists of Bi1−1 and Bi1 are reverses of each other. This contradicts
the relative order of the women on lists of men Bj with j even, since bi1 should be first.
Hence, the size of any rotation is 2. 
Lemma 19. In the 1-attribute model, every man (and woman) participates in at most one rotation.
Proof. Supposeman B1 participates inmore than one rotation. Startingwith his partner in themale-optimalmatching, man
B1 goes down his preference list with each rotation he participates in. Suppose b1 is the partner of B1 in the male-optimal
matching, and b2 and b3 are partners of B1 after the first and second rotations, respectively, that involve B1. Let B2 and B3 be
the partners of b2 and b3 when they participate in the respective rotations with B1. The preference lists of B1, B2, B3, b1, b2,
and b3 are as follows.
B1 | · · · b1 · · · b2 · · · b3 · · ·
B2 | · · · b2 · · · b1 · · ·
B3 | · · · b3 · · · b2 · · ·
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · ·
b2 | · · · B3 · · · B1 · · · B2
b3 | · · · B1 · · · B3 · · ·
We note that B2 and B3 have the same preference lists and B1 has the reverse preference list. Hence, their preference lists
appear as follows.
B1 | · · · b1 · · · b2 · · · b3 · · ·
B2 | · · · b3 · · · b2 · · · b1 · · ·
B3 | · · · b3 · · · b2 · · · b1
Similarly, b1 and b3 have the same preference lists and b2 has the reverse preference list. Hence, their preference lists are
as follows.
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · · B3
b2 | · · · B3 · · · B1 · · · B2
b3 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · · B3 · · ·
When B1 and B2 participate in the rotation, their partners are b1 and b2 respectively. This implies that (B2, b2) is a stable
pair and is part of a stable matching. Hence, the pair (B2, b3) cannot be a blocking pair. For (B2, b3) not to be a blocking pair,
b3 should be married to someone higher than B2 on her list, say Bx. In other words, b3 should be married to Bx before the
rotation involving B1 and B2 occurs and cannot to married to anyone lower than Bx after the rotation has occurred because
b3 can only go up her preference list after future rotations.
b3 | · · · Bx · · · B2 · · · B1 · · · B3 · · ·
This implies that b3 can never bemarried to B1 or B3 in the future, and the rotation involving the pairs (B1, b2) and (B3, b3)
which happens after the rotation involving B1 and B2 violates that. Hence, any man (and woman) can participate in at most
one rotation. 
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 16, which we repeat here.
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Theorem 16. In the 1-attribute model, the rotation poset of a stable matching instance is (isomorphic to) a path.
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we need to show that any two rotations are comparable, as this gives a total ordering
on the set of rotations.
We start by computing the male-optimal and female-optimal stable matchings. The men who have the same partner in
both matchings are removed along with their partners from the problem instance, as their presence or absence does not
affect the rotation poset. So we may assume that every man and women in the stable matching instance is involved in at
least one rotation.
Since every rotation involves exactly two men and two women (Lemma 18), and, by removing the men and women
that are not involved in any rotations, we see that each man and woman that remains is involved in exactly one rotation
(Lemma 19). Thus, the number of men and women in the (reduced) matching instance must be even.
Let the 2kmen be denoted {B1, . . . , B2k} and the 2kwomen be denoted {b1, . . . , b2k}. By relabeling, we can assume that
the male-optimal matching pairs man Bi with woman bi, and the female-optimal matching pairs man B2i−1 with woman
b2i, and man B2i with woman b2i−1. In other words, there are k rotations R1, R2, . . . , Rk and rotation Ri is of the form
{(B2i−1, b2i−1), (B2i, b2i)}. We want to show that any two rotations are comparable, i.e., for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, where
i ≠ j, either Ri precedes Rj or Rj precedes Ri.
Let us compare two rotations, say R1 and R2. The men and women involved in the two rotations are {B1, B2, B3, B4} and
{b1, b2, b3, b4}.
The preference list of B2 is the reverse of B1’s and that of B3 is the reverse of B4’s. Without loss of generality, we could
assume that B1 and B3 have the same preference lists and that b3 comes ahead of b1 on their preference lists. Therefore, the
partial preference lists of the men appear as follows.
B1 | · · · b3 · · · b1 · · · b2 · · ·
B2 | · · · b2 · · · b1 · · · b3
B3 | · · · b3 · · · b4 · · ·
B4 | · · · b4 · · · b3 · · ·
The partial preference lists of the women are given below.
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · ·
b2 | · · · B1 · · · B2 · · ·
b3 | · · · B4 · · · B3 · · ·
b4 | · · · B3 · · · B4 · · ·
The pair (B1, b3)must not be a blocking pair to the male-optimal matching that pairs Bi to bi. Since b3 appears ahead of
b1 on B1’s preference list, B1 should appear after B3 on b3’s preference list. Therefore, the women’s partial preference lists
are as follows.
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B1 · · ·
b2 | · · · B1 · · · B2 · · ·
b3 | · · · B4 · · · B3 · · · B1
b4 | · · · B1 · · · B3 · · · B4 · · ·
Since the female-optimal matching pairs (B2i−1, b2i) and (B2i, b2i−1), the pair (B1, b4) cannot be a blocking pair. Since B1
appears ahead of B3 on b4’s preference list, b4 should appear after b2 on B1’s preference list. So the men’s partial preference
lists are as follows.
B1 | · · · b3 · · · b1 · · · b2 · · · b4
B2 | · · · b4 · · · b2 · · · b1 · · · b3
B3 | · · · b3 · · · b1 · · · b2 · · · b4
B4 | · · · b4 · · · b2 · · · b1 · · · b3
Since the male-optimal matching pairs (Bi, bi), we see that (B2, b4) cannot be a blocking pair. Since b4 appears ahead of
b2 on B2’s preference list, B2 should appear after B4 on b4’s preference list. This gives usmore information about thewomen’s
partial preference lists.
b1 | · · · B2 · · · B4 · · · B3 · · · B1
b2 | · · · B1 · · · B3 · · · B4 · · · B2
b3 | · · · B2 · · · B4 · · · B3 · · · B1
b4 | · · · B1 · · · B3 · · · B4 · · · B2
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Comparing the preference lists for the men and the women, we observe that in the men’s preference lists the women
involved in one rotation are sandwiched by the women of the other rotation. A similar thing happens in the women’s
preference lists, except that the rotations reverse their roles here, i.e. if the women from rotation R sandwich the women
from rotation R′ in the men’s preference lists, then the men from R′ sandwich the men from R in the women’s preference
lists. Since this is true for the men and women in every pair of rotations, we could assume that all odd men have b1 and b2
as the innermost pair, enveloped by b3 and b4 and so on. In other words, the preference lists for the men are as follows.
B1 | b2k−1 b2k−3 · · · b3 b1 b2 b4 · · · b2k−2 b2k
B2 | b2k b2k−2 · · · b4 b2 b1 b3 · · · b2k−3 b2k−1
B3 | b2k−1 b2k−3 · · · b3 b1 b2 b4 · · · b2k−2 b2k
...
...
...
B2k−2 | b2k b2k−2 · · · b4 b2 b1 b3 · · · b2k−3 b2k−1
B2k−1 | b2k−1 b2k−3 · · · b3 b1 b2 b4 · · · b2k−2 b2k
B2k | b2k b2k−2 · · · b4 b2 b1 b3 · · · b2k−3 b2k−1
This fixes the preference lists for the women and they are as follows.
b1 | B2 B4 · · · B2k−2 B2k B2k−1 B2k−3 · · · B3 B1
b2 | B1 B3 · · · B2k−3 B2k−1 B2k B2k−2 · · · B4 B2
b3 | B2 B4 · · · B2k−2 B2k B2k−1 B2k−3 · · · B3 B1
...
...
...
b2k−2 | B1 B3 · · · B2k−3 B2k−1 B2k B2k−2 · · · B4 B2
b2k−1 | B2 B4 · · · B2k−2 B2k B2k−1 B2k−3 · · · B3 B1
b2k | B1 B3 · · · B2k−3 B2k−1 B2k B2k−2 · · · B4 B2
Suppose 1 ≤ i < k. Recall that Ri is of the form {(B2i−1, b2i−1), (B2i, b2i)} and Ri+1 is {(B2i+1, b2i+1), (B2i+2, b2i+2)}. Now
Ri moves b2i−1 from B2i−1, which is below B2i+1 on its preference list to B2i, which is above B2i+1 on its preference list. Hence
the rotation Ri eliminates the pair (B2i+1, b2i−1). Also, Ri+1 moves B2i+1 to b2i+2, which is strictly worse for B2i+1 than b2i−1.
Thus, Ri explicitly precedes Ri+1 (takingM = B2i+1 andw = b2i−1 in Definition 3.6). 
6. Stable matchings in the k-Euclidean model
Having given our construction for the k-attribute setting, we now turn to the k-Euclidean model. We remind the reader
that in this model every man, say Ai, is associated with two points in Rk. One of the points, A¯i, denotes his position and the
other, Aˆi, denotes the position of his ideal partner. We refer to A¯i as the position point of Ai and to Aˆi as the preference point of
Ai. Similarly, each women has her own position and preference points. Each man ranks the women based on the Euclidean
distance between his own preference point and the women’s position points. In other words, if the distance between Aˆi and
b¯ is less than the distance between Aˆi and c¯ , then Ai prefers b over c (b appears higher in his preference list than c).
In this section we work in the 2-dimensional Euclidean model. Our goal here is to establish Theorem 3, which we repeat
below.
Theorem 3. #BIS ≡AP #SM(k-Euclidean) when k ≥ 2.
Theorem 3 asserts that #BIS and #SM(k-Euclidean) are AP-interreducible for k ≥ 2. Since the AP-reduction from
#SM(k-Euclidean) to #BIS follows easily from known results (see Section 3.5), we now give an AP-reduction from #BIS
to #SM(k-Euclidean).
As in Section 4, we will show how to take an instance G of #BIS and, in polynomial time, construct an instance I
of #SM(k-Euclidean) so that the number of stable matchings of I is equal to the number of independent sets of G.
Let G = (V1∪V2, E) be an instance of #BIS with |E| = n. Wewill construct a 2-Euclidean stablematching instance having
3nmen and 3n women. Our construction will use the ρ-cycles and σ -cycles defined in Section 4.1.1 . To specify the stable
matching instance, we now give position and preference points for the 3nmen and women.
First, we position the 3n women a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, c1, . . . , cn such that the b-women lie on the y-axis and the
a-women and c-women lie on the x-axis. We represent woman wi by w¯i = (w¯i(x), w¯i(y)), where w¯i(x) and w¯i(y) are her
x- and y-coordinates. The coordinates of a¯i, b¯i and c¯i are (a¯i(x), 0), (0, b¯i(y)) and (c¯i(x), 0), respectively. We impose further
restrictions on the coordinates of a¯i, b¯i, and c¯i.
Let b¯ρi(y) = a¯i(x), c¯σ−1 i(x) = a¯i(x)− 0.7 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Fixing the x-coordinates of a¯1, . . . , a¯n therefore fixes the positions of all of the women. Suppose D1 through Dl are
the l cycles of σ of lengths p1 through pl, respectively. As before, let ei be a representative element of cycle Di. So Di =
{ei, σ (ei), . . . , σ pi−1(ei)}. Also as before, let Rep(σ ) = {e1, e2 . . . , el} be the set of representative elements of the σ -cycles.
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LetWi = {ax : x ∈ Di} ∪ {cx : x ∈ Di}. We set p0 = 0. For woman aσ hej , where ej ∈ Rep(σ ), and 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1, we set
a¯σ hej(x) =
j−1
i=0 2pi + h+ 1. The position points of the women are as follows.
For ej ∈ Rep(σ ), 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 let
a¯σ hej =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1, 0

,
b¯ρσ hej =

0,
j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1

, and
c¯σ (h−1)ej =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.3, 0

.
Next we fix the locations in the x-y plane for the ideal partners of themen as follows, i.e. we specify the preference points
for each man.
Let ϵ = 1/100n.
For ej ∈ Rep(σ ), 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 let
Aˆσ hej =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1,
j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ

,
Bˆσ hej =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1, 1000n

, and
Cˆσ (h−1)ej =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6, 0

.
Having fixed the position of the women and the preference points for the men, we next fix the position of the men and
the preference points of the women.
First, we position the 3nmen A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cn such that the C-men lie on the y-axis and the A-men and
B-men lie on the x-axis. We represent man mi by M¯i = (M¯i(x), M¯i(y)), where M¯i(x) and M¯i(y) are his x- and y-coordinates.
The coordinates of A¯i, B¯i and C¯i are (A¯i(x), 0), (B¯i(x), 0) and (0, C¯i(y)), respectively. We impose further restrictions on the
coordinates of A¯i, B¯i, and C¯i.
Let B¯i(x) = C¯i(y), A¯ρ−1 i(x) = B¯i(x)− 0.7 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Here again, fixing the x-coordinates of B¯1, . . . , B¯n therefore fixes the positions of all of the men. Suppose E1 through Ek
are the k cycles of ρ of lengths q1 through qk, respectively. As before, let fi be a representative element of cycle Ei, which is
the element of Ei with the smallest index. So Ei = {fi, ρ(fi), . . . , ρqi−1(fi)} = {fi, fi + 1, . . . , fi + qi − 1}. Also as before, let
Rep(ρ) = {f1, f2 . . . , fk} be the set of representative elements of the ρ-cycles.
Let Wi = {Bx : x ∈ Ei} ∪ {Ax : x ∈ Ei}. We set q0 = 0. For man Bρhfj , where fj ∈ Rep(ρ), and 0 ≤ h ≤ qj − 1, we set
B¯ρhfj(x) =
j−1
i=0 2qi + h+ 1. The position points of the men are as follows.
For fj ∈ Rep(ρ), 0 ≤ h ≤ qj − 1 let
A¯ρh−1fj =

j−1
i=0
2qi + h+ 0.3, 0

,
B¯ρhfj =

j−1
i=0
2qi + h+ 1, 0

, and
C¯ρhfj =

0,
j−1
i=0
2qi + h+ 1

.
Next we fix the locations in the x–y plane for the ideal partners of the women as follows, i.e. we specify the preference
points for each woman.
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Let ϵ = 1/100n.
For fj ∈ Rep(ρ), 0 ≤ h ≤ qj − 1
let aˆρhfj =

j−1
i=0
2qi + h+ 1, 1000n

,
bˆρhfj =

j−1
i=0
2qi + h+ 0.6, 0

, and
cˆρhfj =

j−1
i=0
2qi + h+ 1,
j−1
i=0
2qi + h+ 1− ϵ

.
Having assigned position and preference points for both the men and the women, we construct the initial part of the
preference lists of the men, starting with man Cσ (h−1)ej . We compare the distances of the women from Cˆσ (h−1)ej to produce
the initial part of the preference list.
ej, em ∈ Rep(σ ), 0 ≤ f , h ≤ pj − 1, 0 ≤ g ≤ pm − 1
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , b¯ρσ g em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6− 0
2
+

0−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
2
≥ 0.62 + 12 = 1.36
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , c¯σ (h−1)ej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6 −
j−1
i=0
2pi − h− 0.3
2
+ (0− 0)2 = 0.09 and
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , a¯σ hej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6 −
j−1
i=0
2pi − h− 1
2
+ (0− 0)2 = 0.16.
For h ≠ f ,
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , c¯σ (f−1)ej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
j−1
i=0
2pi − f − 0.3
2
+ (0− 0)2
≥ (|h− f | − 0.3)2 ≥ (1− 0.3)2 = 0.49 and
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , a¯σ (f )ej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
j−1
i=0
2pi − f − 1
2
+ (0− 0)2
≥ (|h− f | − 0.4)2 ≥ (1− 0.4)2 = 0.36.
Form > j,
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , c¯σ (g−1)em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3
2
+ (0− 0)2
≥
m−1
i=j
2pi + g
− |h+ 0.3|
2
≥ (2pj − (pj − 1)− 0.3)2 ≥ (2− 0.3)2 = 2.89 and
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , a¯σ g em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
2
+ (0− 0)2
≥
m−1
i=j
2pi + g + 0.4
− |h|
2
≥ (2pj + 0.4− (pj − 1))2 ≥ 2.42 = 5.76.
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For j > m,
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , c¯σ (g−1)em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3
2
+ (0− 0)2
≥
 j−1
i=m
2pi + h+ 0.3
− |g|
2
≥ (2pm + 0.3− (pm − 1))2 ≥ 2.32 = 5.29 and
d2(Cˆσ (h−1)ej , a¯σ g em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 0.6−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
2
+ (0− 0)2
≥
 j−1
i=m
2pi + h
− |g + 0.4|
2
≥ (2pm − (pm − 1)− 0.4)2 ≥ (1.6)2 = 2.56.
From the above analysis, it follows that the preference list of Cσ (h−1)ej startswith cσ (h−1)ejaσ hej for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 0 ≤ h ≤ pj−1
as in Section 4.1.3.
Nowwe carry out a similar analysis to determine the initial part of the preference list ofAσ hej .We note that
l
i=1 2pi = 2n
and 2ϵ ·2n = 4n100n ≤ 0.04. This implies that in the following analysis we could upper bound the term 2ϵ ·(
j
i=1(2pi)+h+1)
by 0.04.
ϵ = 1/100n, ej, em ∈ Rep(σ ), 0 ≤ f , h ≤ pj − 1, 0 ≤ g ≤ pm − 1
d2(Aˆσ hej , a¯σ hej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − h− 1
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ − 0
2
=

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
d2(Aˆσ hej , b¯ρσ hej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− 0
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ −
j−1
i=0
2pi − h− 1
2
=

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2
d2(Aˆσ hej , c¯σ h−1ej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − h− 0.3
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ − 0
2
= 0.72 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
=

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
+ 0.49
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 0.45.
For h ≠ f ,
d2(Aˆσ hej , a¯σ f ej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − f − 1
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ − 0
2
= (h− f )2 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
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≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
+ 1
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 0.96
d2(Aˆσ hej , b¯ρσ f ej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− 0
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ −
j−1
i=0
2pi − f − 1
2
=

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ (h− f − ϵ)2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ (1− ϵ)2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 0.98
d2(Aˆσ hej , c¯σ f−1ej) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − f − 0.3
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ − 0
2
= (h− f − 0.7)2 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
+ 0.09
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 0.05
Form > j,
d2(Aˆσ hej , a¯σ g em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ − 0
2
≥
m−1
i=j
2pi + g
− |h|
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥ (2pj − (pj − 1))2 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
+ 4
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 3.96
d2(Aˆσ hej , b¯ρσ g em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− 0
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ −
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+
m−1
i=j
2pi + g + ϵ
− |h|
2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ (2pj + ϵ − (pj − 1))2
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≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ (2+ ϵ)2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 4
d2(Aˆσ hej , c¯σ g−1em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ − 0
2
≥
m−1
i=j
2pi + g
− |h+ 0.7|
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥ (2pj − (pj − 1)− 0.7)2 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥ (2− 0.7)2 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
=

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
+ 1.69
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 1.65.
For j > m,
d2(Aˆσ hej , a¯σ g em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ − 0
2
≥
 j−1
i=m
2pi + h
− |g|
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥ (2pm − (pm − 1))2 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
+ 4
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 3.96
d2(Aˆσ hej , b¯ρσ g em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− 0
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ −
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+
 j−1
i=m
2pi + h
− |g + ϵ|
2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ (2pm − (pm − 1)− ϵ)2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ (2− ϵ)2
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 3.96
64 P. Chebolu et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 437 (2012) 35–68
d2(Aˆσ hej , c¯σ g−1em) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
m−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ − 0
2
≥
 j−1
i=m
2pi + h+ 0.7
− |g|
2
+

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥ (2pm − (pm − 1)+ 0.7)2 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
≥ (2+ 0.7)2 +

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
=

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− ϵ
2
+ 7.29
≥

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ ϵ2 + 7.25.
From the above analysis, it follows that the preference list of Aσ hej starts with aσ hejbρσ hej for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1 as in
Section 4.1.3.
Last, we study the preference list of Bσ hej . First we will show that the preference list of man Bσ hej , where 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 0 ≤
h ≤ pj − 1, starts with
bρσ (pl−1)elbρσ (pl−2)el · · · bρelbρσ (pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ (p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1 .
We obtain the above preference list by comparing distances between Bˆσ hej and the positions of the women.
ej, ek ∈ Rep(σ ), 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1, 0 ≤ f ≤ pk − 1
d2(Bˆσ hej , b¯ρσ f ek) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1− 0
2
+

1000n −
k−1
i=0
2pi − f − 1
2
≤

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1
2
+ (1000n − 1)2 < (1000n)2
d2(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ f ek) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1
i=0
2pi − f − 1
2
+ (1000n − 0)2
≥ (1000n)2
d2(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ f−1ek) =

j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1
i=0
2pi − f − 0.3
2
+ (1000n − 0)2
≥ (1000n)2.
It immediately follows that the b-women are all closer to Bˆσ hej than any of the a-women or c-women. Hence, the
preference list of Bσ hej would start with all the b-women coming first. We also note that the b-women all have their
x-component set to 0. Hence, Bσ hej would rank the b-women by measuring their distance from Bˆσ hej in the y-component.
We also note that 1000n − 2n > 0 for n ≥ 1. Next we compare distances between Bˆσ hej and the b-women only using the
y-component. We will use the notation dy(·, ·) to denote the distance in the y-component.
ej, ek1 , ek2 ∈ Rep(σ ), 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 1, 0 ≤ g ≤ pk1 − 1, 0 ≤ f ≤ pk2 − 1.
For k1 = k2 and g > f , we have
dy(Bˆσ hej , b¯ρσ g ek1 ) = 1000n −
k1−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1 < 1000n −
k1−1
i=0
2pi − f − 1
= 1000n −
k2−1
i=0
2pi − f − 1 = dy(Bˆσ hej , b¯ρσ f ek2 ).
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For k1 > k2, we have
dy(Bˆσ hej , b¯ρσ f ek2 )− dy(Bˆσ hej , b¯ρσ g ek1 ) =

1000n −
k2−1
i=0
2pi − f − 1

−

1000n −
k1−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1

=
k1−1
i=0
2pi + g −
k2−1
i=0
2pi − f =
k1−1
i=k2
2pi + g − f
≥ 2pk2 + g − (pk2 − 1) = pk2 + 1+ g > 0.
From the above discussion, it follows that the preference list of Bσ hej starts with
bρσ (pl−1)elbρσ (pl−2)el · · · bρelbρσ (pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ (p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1 .
Nextwe compare the distances of a-women and c-women from Bˆσ hej . As a-women and c-women all have their y-component
set to 0, Bσ hej would rank the b-women bymeasuring their distance from Bˆσ hej in the x-component. Wewill use the notation
dx(·, ·) to denote the distance in the x-component. We consider two cases (i) h ≠ pi − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, (ii) h = pi − 1, for
some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}.
Case(i) h ≠ pi − 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ l: Now we compute and compare the distances between Bˆσ hej and the a-women and the
c-women.
ej, ek ∈ Rep(σ ), 0 ≤ h ≤ pj − 2, 0 ≤ g ≤ pk − 1.
For k = j and g = h, we have
dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ g ek) = dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ hej)
=
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − h− 1
 = 0 and
dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g ek) = dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ hej)
=
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − (h+ 1)− 0.3
 = 0.3.
For k = j and g /∈ {h, pj − 1}, we have
dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ g ek) = dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ g ej)
=
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
 = |h− g| ≥ 1 and
dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g ek) = dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g ej)
=
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1− 0.3
 ≥ ||h− g| − 0.3| ≥ 0.7.
For k = j and g = pj − 1, we have
dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ g ek) = dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ pj−1ej)
=
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − (pj − 1)− 1

= |h− (pj − 1)| ≥ 1 (because h ≠ pj − 1) and
dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g ek) = dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ pj−1ej) = dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ−1ej)
=
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − 0.3
 ≥ |h+ 0.7| ≥ 0.7.
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For k > jwe have
dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ g ek) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1

=
 k−1
i=j
2pi + g − h

≥ |2pj + g − (pj − 1)| ≥ |pj + 1+ g| ≥ 2 and
dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g−1ek) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3

=
 k−1
i=j
2pi + g − h− 0.7

≥ |2pj + g − (pj − 1)− 0.7| ≥ |pj + 1+ g − 0.7| ≥ 1.3.
For k < jwe have
dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ g ek) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
 =
 j−1
i=k
2pi + h− g

≥ |2pk + h− (pk − 1)| ≥ |pk + 1+ h| ≥ 2 and
dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g−1ek) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
k−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3
 =
 j−1
i=k
2pi + h+ 0.7− g

≥ |2pk + h+ 0.7− (pk − 1)| ≥ |pk + 1.7+ h| ≥ 2.7.
It follows from the comparison that Bσ hej prefers aσ hej over cσ hej and cσ hej over any other a-woman and the c-woman. Hence,
the initial part of the preference list of Bσ hej reads
bρσ (pl−1)elbρσ (pl−2)el · · · bρelbρσ (pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ (p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1aσ hejcσ hej .
Case(ii) h = pi − 1, for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}: Now we compare the distances between Bˆσ hej and the a-women and the
c-women.
ej, ek ∈ Rep(σ ), h = pj − 1, 0 ≤ g ≤ pk − 1.
For k = j and g = h, we have
dx(Bˆσ hej , a¯σ g ek) = dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , a¯σ pj−1ej)
=
 j−1
i=0
2pi + h+ 1−
j−1
i=0
2pi − h− 1
 = 0 and
dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g ek) = dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , c¯σ pj−1ej) = dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , c¯σ−1ej)
=
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1
i=0
2pi − 0.3
 = pj − 0.3.
For k > jwe have
dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , a¯σ g ek) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
k−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1

=
 k−1
i=j
2pi + g + 1− pj
 ≥ |2pj + g + 1− pj|
≥ |pj + 1+ g| ≥ pj + 1 and
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dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g−1ek) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
k−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3

=
 k−1
i=j
2pi + g + 0.3− pj
 ≥ |2pj + g + 0.3− pj|
≥ |pj + 0.3+ g| ≥ pj + 0.3.
For k < jwe have
dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , a¯σ g ek) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
k−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1

=
 j−1
i=k
2pi + pj − g − 1
 ≥ |2pk + pj − pk|
≥ |pk + pj| ≥ pj + 1 and
dx(Bˆσ hej , c¯σ g−1ek) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
k−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3

=
 j−1
i=k
2pi + pj − g − 0.3
 ≥ |2pk + pj − (pk − 1)− 0.3|
≥ |pk + pj + 0.7| ≥ pj + 1.7.
From the above inequalities, it follows that Bσ hej prefers aσ pj−1ej over cσ−1ej , and cσ−1ej over a-women and c-women whose
subscript belongs to σ cycles different from that of cσ−1ej ’s. Now we compute and compare distances from Bˆσ hej to all the
a-women and c-women whose subscript is on the same σ cycle as a
σ
pj−1ej ’s and cσ−1ej ’s.
For 0 ≤ g ≤ pj − 2 we have
dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , c¯σ g ej)− dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , a¯σ g ej) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1− 0.3
−
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1

= pj − g − 1.3− (pj − g − 1) < 0
and for 0 ≤ g ≤ pj − 1 we have
dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , a¯σ g ej)− dx(Bˆσ pj−1ej , c¯σ g−1ej) =
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1
i=0
2pi − g − 1
−
 j−1
i=0
2pi + pj −
j−1
i=0
2pi − g − 0.3

= pj − g − 1− (pj − g − 0.3) < 0.
From the above comparisons, it follows that B
σ
pj−1ej prefers aσ pj−1ej over cσ pj−2ej , cσ g ej over aσ g ej and aσ g ej over cσ g−1ej for
0 ≤ g ≤ pj − 2. Stringing these preferences together, we obtain a portion of Bσ pj−1ej ’s preference list, which appears as
a
σ
pj−1ejcσ pj−2ejaσ pj−2ejcσ pj−3ej · · · cσ ejaσ ejcejaejcσ−1ej(= cσ pj−1ej).
We remind the reader that B
σ
pj−1ej ’s preference list has all the b-women appearing at the front appended by the above
list of a-women and c-women. Hence, the initial part of B
σ
pj−1ej ’s preference list is
bρσ (pl−1)el · · · bρelbρσ (pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ (p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1
a
σ
(pj−1)ejcσ (pj−2)ejaσ (pj−2)ej · · · cejaejcσ−1ej(= cσ (pj−1)ej).
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The initial part of the preference lists of men Aσ sei , Cσ s−1ei and Bσ sei are as follows.
ei ∈ Rep(σ ),
Aσmei : aσmeibρσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1
Cσ (m−1)ei : cσ (m−1)eiaσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 1
Bσmei : bρσ (pl−1)el · · · bρelbρσ (pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · ·
bρσ (p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1aσmeicσmei , 0 ≤ m ≤ pi − 2
Bσ (pi−1)ei : bρσ (pl−1)el · · · bρelbρσ (pl−1−1)el−1 · · · bρel−1 · · · bρσ (p1−1)e1 · · · bρe1aσ (pi−1)cσ (pi−2)ei
aσ (pi−2)ei · · · aσ eiceiaeicσ (pi−1)ei .
Note that these are exactly the same as those in (4) for any appropriate value of the permutation τ . In a similar manner, we
can obtain preference lists for the women. The preference lists for the women are as follows.
fi ∈ Rep(ρ),
bρmfi : Aρ(m−1)fiBρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
cρmfi : BρmfiCρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 1
aρmfi : Cρ(qk−1)fk · · · CfkCρ(qk−1−1)fk−1 · · · Cfk−1 · · ·
Cρ(q1−1)f1 · · · Cf1BρmfiAρmfi , 0 ≤ m ≤ qi − 2
aρ(qi−1)fi : Cρ(qk−1)fk · · · CfkCρ(qk−1−1)fk−1 · · · Cfk−1Bρ(qi−1)fiAρ(qi−2)fi
Bρ(qi−2)fi · · · BρfiAfiBfiAρ(qi−1)fi .
Now note that, by the construction of the ρ cycles, which go in order from 1 to n, the list
Cρ(qk−1)fk · · · CfkCρ(qk−1−1)fk−1 · · · Cfk−1 · · · Cρ(q1−1)f1 · · · Cf1
is identically Cn · · · C1. Thus, the preference lists for the women are identical to those given in (3). Thus, the rest of the proof
is exactly the same as in the 3-attribute case, starting from the introduction of the men’s lists (4) in Section 4.2.
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